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Labor Standards and Trade Agreements: The Impact of Trade Negotiations on Country Adoption 
of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining1 
 
Stephanie Luce 
University of Massachusetts-Amherst 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The idea of international labor standards was first introduced with the formation of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919 and there has been debate about the nature and 
form of such standards ever since. In the 1990s, policymakers and trade unionists debated 
whether or not to include labor standards in trade agreements. Although the WTO does not 
include a “social clause” in the negotiation of multilateral trading rules, increasingly, bilateral 
and some multilateral trade agreements include some language about labor standards. The debate 
has shifted from if labor standards should be included, to how they should be included and which 
standards are appropriate. The inclusion of labor standards in bilateral agreements raises a 
number of questions. What process of negotiation leads countries to strengthen domestic labor 
rights? What language is most likely to be implemented and enforced? What incentives exist for 
countries to improve working conditions? Do such labor rights have an impact on improving 
wages? 
 
In the past several decades, individual countries and international institutions have made 
great advances in improving conditions for workers engaged in areas affected by international 
trade. According to Aaronson and Rioux (2008), over 160 countries and regions have adopted 
some form of labor standards attached to trade agreements, trade promotion agreements, or 
international investment framework agreements. The United States has also adopted labor 
standards in various forms, including some attached to Generalized System of Preferences in the 
U.S. Trade Act, labor side agreements in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
a garment trade preference program in Cambodia, agreements negotiated under the Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, and agreements negotiated under the May 10, 2007 
Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy.  
 
Despite the proliferation of labor standards-related language in trade agreements, there is 
little research on the impacts of these provisions and the negotiations surrounding them.  
  
 This report examines the relationship between free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations 
and labor standards, particularly the fundamental labor principles or internationally recognized 
rights. We attempt to answer the following research question: To what extent do the labor 
standards-related requirements of U.S. trade agreements encourage potential trade partners to 
improve labor standards in their countries prior to pursuing a trade agreement with the United 
States or during the negotiation and implementation process? 
                                                 
1 We thank David Kucera for sharing his database with us. We also thank Joan Sherer, Senior Reference Librarian at 
the State Department and Sylvie De Ryck at the International Trade Union Confederation for providing us annual 
reports for 1981-1995; and Quinn Kepes at Vérité for providing data from their labor standards index. David 
Wemhoener, Elvis Mendez and Andy Santos provided research assistance. 
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 Section 2 provides a literature review on scholarship related to the question at hand. In 
Section 3, we provide a conceptual framework for our study, proposing an approach to 
examining changes in labor standards in countries that have signed FTAs with the United States. 
We examine standards in a broad sense, including laws, regulations, executive orders and court 
rulings. Next, Section 4 describes our data and methodology employed to construct an annual 
index of labor standards. We provide results in Section 5. This includes a quantitative analysis of 
our index, as we attempt to discern patterns in labor standards over time in relation to trade 
agreement negotiations. From there, we examine four countries in-depth in Section 6.  
 
Given the results presented in Sections 5 and 6, we discuss their relevance for trade 
policy in Section 7, and then conclude with caveats and limitations of the work. We provide 
some thoughts on directions for future research based on these last two sections. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 There are a growing number of trade agreements that include language requiring 
countries to adhere to eight ILO core Conventions and their related standards, but there is little 
agreement about how to measure compliance. Scholars have noted the complexities of 
quantifying labor standards, which includes many dimensions, such as labor law, regulations and 
decrees; legal decisions; institutional capacity to monitor and enforce; and penalties for non-
compliance. As Compa (2005) notes, true measures of labor standards must also consider both 
the positive and negative application of labor rights. Positive application of labor standards 
includes the state passing laws and regulations that provide expansive access to these rights, as 
well as providing real protections to workers exercising those rights. The negative aspect 
examines the ways in which the state and/or employers may interfere with workers who attempt 
to exercise their rights.  
 
 In addition, measurement of standards must be able to take into account the history of 
each country. Some aspects of labor standards might be measured by absolute measures, but in 
other cases, they are best understood as changes relative to the past. Each aspect of labor 
standards is couched in a long history within a country. This means that any measure would 
ideally be comparable across countries but also within country, over time.  
 
 To date, most measurement efforts have focused on one particular area of labor standards 
- freedom of association and collective bargaining (FA/CB), child labor, forced labor, or 
discrimination.2 The Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards at the National 
Research Council convened a workshop in 2002 on the best practices for evaluating these aspects 
of international labor standards and published the findings in a volume in 2004 (National 
Research Council 2004). Another volume, edited in 2007 by ILO researcher David Kucera, 
summarizes findings from a 2004 meeting of experts to discuss measurement of labor standards 
                                                 
2 A few organizations (such as Social Accountability International) have focused on ways to monitor and measure 
labor standards with a company or factory as the unit of analysis. We are focusing here on evaluations with a 
country as the unit of analysis. 
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(Kucera 2007). These findings are discussed here, along with other scholarship that has 
examined compliance with labor standards. 
 
 We first provide a detailed discussion on efforts to measure FA/CB, then a cursory 
review of efforts to measure the other areas. 
 
2.1 Freedom of Association/Collective Bargaining 
 
 Two of the core ILO Conventions address freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining. As labor law scholar Lance Compa notes, it is not enough just to observe 
whether a country has ratified an ILO convention or passed a domestic law (Compa 2002; Hilton 
2003). A better measure would first include the following four dimensions: 
 
1) freedom of association in general (including the freedom of workers to form and join any 
kind of association); 
2) the right to organize unions; 
3) the right to engage in collective bargaining; and 
4) the right to strike. 
 
 In addition, Compa argues that the best index would include direct and indirect measures. 
Direct measures would be specific laws and regulations, and would be evaluated based on 
fieldwork and reading of legal texts. Indirect measures try to capture rights by looking at 
associated factors, such as number of strikes, number of union activists arrested, or union 
density. Indirect measures are usually easier to access and are more likely consistent between 
countries, but they cannot replace direct measures. The ideal measure would also use consistent 
methods to place the findings in a “real-world context” (Compa 2005). 
 
 The Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards at the National Research 
Council has concluded that the best approach to measuring compliance with FA/CB is through 
three dimensions: 
• the legal framework (at all levels of government), 
• the government's performance (at all levels of government) in implementation, and  
• the overall outcomes. 
After extensive study, the Committee chose the ILO recommendations of at least 21 specific 
indicators to measure legal framework; 13 indicators to measure government performance; and 4 
indicators to measure overall outcomes.3 This list of indicators would provide a comprehensive 
baseline assessment of a country’s compliance with FA/CB. However, there are serious data 
limitations that prevent scholars from collecting consistent information for each of these 
indicators. This means that researchers must develop alternative measures to capture as much of 
these indicators as possible. 
 
                                                 
3 See the WebMILS page for more detail: http://webapps.dol.gov/webmils/assessing-compliance.aspx 
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 Kuruvilla, Hossain and Berger (2010) state that there are at least 28 different measures of 
FA/CB in use today.4 They group these into measures based on available quantitative data (such 
as union density); measures based on labor law; measures of collective bargaining rights; and 
those that focus on the role of government. They note that there is no consensus on which 
measure to use, and there is often a trade-off between in-depth quality information on the one 
hand, and transparent information from uniform sources on the other.  
 
.  Some of these measures rely on simple proxy measures of FA/CB. One option is to use 
union density in a country, assuming that density is a proxy for the FA/CB rights. This can be 
problematic for several reasons. First, union density is not available for every country or for 
every year. Countries measure union membership in different ways, making it hard to compare 
across countries. Finally, density may be a poor proxy for rights, depending on the institutional 
and legal framework in a country. For example, there may be relatively high union membership 
in a country like China, where workers do not actually enjoy FA/CB rights. 
 
 Another index used as a proxy by a number of scholars to measure FA is the Freedom 
House political rights and civil liberties index.  Freedom House is an independent organization 
which tracks political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world. Since 1972, 
Freedom House has compiled a measure of political rights and civil liberties by country. 
Although it does not specifically measure freedom of association and rights to collective 
bargaining, some scholars have used some of the categories as a proxy for measuring freedom of 
association (e.g. Bivens, Hersh and Weller and 2005). The advantage of this source is that is 
available on an annual basis, and now available for most countries. The disadvantage is that it 
was not designed to capture FA/CB rights. 
 
 There have been several attempts to develop a comprehensive index to measure freedom 
of association/right to collective bargaining across countries. Three of the early measures were 
developed by the OECD, Verite, and David Kucera. Each index uses a different number of 
indicators and a slightly different approach. All rely on three key sources of information: 
ICFTU/ITUC Annual Survey of Trade Union violations; U.S. State Department Human Rights 
reports; and ILO supervisory reports. 
 
 Each of the three sources has strengths and weaknesses. As noted by others, the ILO 
reports are heavily lopsided by region. Approximately half of all Freedom of Association cases 
filed with the ILO relate to Latin American countries (National Research Council 2004). Filing 
ILO complaints takes capacity and it is much less likely that countries with little capacity, or few 
labor rights, would have many complaints filed. As Compa (2005) has noted, the U.S. State 
Department Reports are very detailed in some years, but then appear to be repetitive in other 
years, depending on the number of field staff available to update reports. The ICFTU reports also 
vary in quality, with some years and regions containing much more detail than others. We 
discuss some of the specific weaknesses of these sources in Section 8. 
 
 Kuruvilla, Hossain and Berger (2010) propose an alternative to existing comprehensive 
measures of FA/CB based on the evaluations of national experts, utilizing a combination of 
                                                 
4 A number of these methods are discussed in Kucera 2007. 
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qualitative and quantitative sources. While their proposal would address some of the weaknesses 
of other measures, it would be difficult to construct, particularly without the cooperation of a 
pool of experts. As of now, remains a proposal rather than an actual index.  
 
 The most comprehensive measure of FA/CB is the Kucera index, which includes 37 
indicators and was compiled for 169 countries (Kucera 2007). These 37 indicators are organized 
around six categories or arenas:  
 
• freedom of association/collective bargaining civil rights 
• right to establish and join unions and worker organizations 
• other union activities 
• right to bargain collectively 
• right to strike 
• FA/CB in export processing zones. 
 
 Kucera’s index was compiled for the 1990s, but is not available on an annual basis. 
Ideally, to measure the impact of FTA negotiations or implementation, we would need an annual 
measure to compare how a country changes over time. 
 
 There are a few other weaknesses of the Kucera method. Even though there are more 
criteria in the index, giving the index more depth, the components are all measured as indicator 
variables. Indicator variables (coded as a one or zero) cannot establish rank order or differentiate 
between matters of degree. This means that a country with one or two cases of state interference 
with union demonstrations would be scored the same as a country with regular, consistent 
interference.  The measures don’t allow for variation in laws or regulations within a country 
(such as by state, within the U.S.). 
 
 Even with 37 indicators, there are a number of additional criteria that might be useful to 
include for a measure of FA/CB, such as:  
 
• number of government officials charged with enforcing FA/CB rights or inspecting 
violations 
• typical duration for court system processing CB/FA complaints 
• number and strength of legal protections for workers who file complaints (existence and 
strength of “whistleblower” protections for workers who file complaints 
• union organizers access to company property so they can talk to workers about their right 
to join a union 
• legal sanctions for employers who breach collective bargaining agreements 
 
However, the more criteria added the more difficult it is to collect consistent data by year and 
across countries. Kucera is currently working on an expanded index which includes 168 
indicators (Kucera 2010). 
 
 Some commentators have noted other concerns with Kucera’s method. Compa (2002) 
critiques the subjective nature of the coding and argues that “No purely quantifiable system for 
assessing countries’ compliance with freedom of association standards is possible” (as cited in 
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Kucera 2007, footnote 9). Teitelbaum (2010) raises other concerns about Kucera’s method, 
suggesting that scores will vary based on the level of activity of trade unions by country, thereby 
raising possible endogenity problems. Countries with more activity will likely show up with 
more violations, but this does not necessarily mean the countries with little activity have more 
rights or better standards.  
 
2.2 Child labor 
 
 Child labor has received substantial attention from domestic and international agencies 
concerned with labor rights. As with FA/CB it is important to look at legislation as well as 
regulations and government enforcement, direct and indirect measures, and positive and negative 
applications of rights.  
 
 Child labor as measured in the ILO core standards refers to the ILO Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973 (No. 138) and the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 
182). Convention 138 requires countries to establish a law establishing the minimum age of 
work. But Convention 182 defines “child” as anyone under age 18. The Worst Forms of Child 
Labour includes all forms of slavery or forced labor; use of children in prostitution or 
pornography; use of children for illicit activities such as drug trafficking; and hazardous work.   
The ILO provides information on complaints by Convention, by Country, as well as information 
on changes to laws and regulations. In 2008, the International Conference of Labour Statisticians 
adopted a resolution regarding the measurement of child labor, setting forth guidelines regarding 
various aspects such as minimum age of work worst forms of child labor. The guidelines provide 
a methodology recommended for a standardized measure in each country. 
 
 The ILO has experimented with household survey methodologies designed to capture 
information on child labor. According to Ritualo, Castro and Gromley: “Based on their findings, 
ILO concluded that the household-based sample survey, supplemented by surveys of employers 
and street children, was the most appropriate methodology for inquiring about children’s work 
and educational activities” (Ritualo, Casto and Gromley 2002-2003). The Statistical Information 
and Monitoring Program on Child Labour within the ILO was created in 1998 and works with 
countries to conduct household surveys to collect data on child labor. These surveys are a useful 
source of data because they are designed specifically to capture information on child labor. 
However, the content and questions can vary from country to country, and not all indicators are 
comparable across countries. 
 
 Another source of data on child labor is the Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(LSMS), conducted by the World Bank since 1980. The LSMS is also a household survey, 
conducted in a few dozen countries—many over repeated years—and some surveys include 
questions on child labor. This can be a useful source but the data is not available for every 
country, and the surveys were not designed to capture information on child labor. In some cases 
sample sizes are too small, and data on child labor is not detailed.  
 
 Similarly, UNICEF conducts Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys in various countries. 
This survey is intended to measure children’s rights, and child labor is only a subsection of that. 
Sample sizes are larger but the data is not very detailed.  
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 In addition, the U.S. Department of Labor collects data on the worst forms of child labor 
and publishes an annual report. This is part of the requirements for the Trade and Development 
Act of 2000. This data is collected from a variety of sources for all countries where the U.S. has 
some form of trade relationship. These reports are available from 2001 to the present. 
 
 In the 2004 NRC volume, Ritualo is noted as suggesting that child labor measurement 
should include the following components:  
 
1) number and proportion of economically active children; 
2) number and proportion of children who are child laborers; 
3) ratio of children not in school; 
4) proportion of children involved in household chores in their own homes, organized by 
ranges of hours worked; 
5) proportion of children working in industry sectors (agriculture, mining, construction, 
transportation, etc.); 
6) proportion of children working by range of hours worked; and  
7) other indicators that help put child labor within the national context. 
 
The Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards made similar conclusions regarding 
measuring child labor as with FA/CB. Compliance should include indicators for legal 
framework, government performance, and outcomes. The Committee recommends a minimum 
of 11 indicators for legal framework and another 11 for government performance, and seven for 
outcomes.  
 
As with the FA/CB measures, there is still no one source of reliable data, or one index for 
cross-country comparative data on child labor, but researchers are making advances in 
developing shared definitions and preferred methodologies.  
 
2.3 Forced/Compulsory Labor 
 
 The ILO uses two elements to define forced labor. First, the work or service performed 
“is exacted under the menace of a penalty.” Second, the work or service is done involuntarily. 
Based on this definition, the ILO have developed different categorizations to measure forced 
labor. In some reports it notes that there are five main forms of forced labor in effect today: 
slavery and abduction, misuse of public and prison works, forced recruitment, debt bondage and 
domestic workers under forced labor situations, and internal or international trafficking.  
 
 Given that much of this type of work is illegal in many countries it is particularly difficult 
to measure. While many policymakers note that it would be impossible to develop a completely 
accurate measure of forced labor some scholars have attempted to develop methodologies to 
improve our understanding of the scope of the problem.  Ruwanpura and Rai (2004) have 
attempted to advance the methodologies for measuring forced labor, starting with a clearer 
definition of the concept. They note that forced labor is a legal concept but also an economic 
one, as it is closely related to poverty. However, poverty alone is not a sufficient condition for 
forced labor. Bales (2000) declared that there were approximately 27 million people working in 
forced labor but acknowledged that this number was only a rough estimate. In a 2005 report the 
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ILO claimed 12.3 million people working in forced labor but notes the challenges in collecting 
data, particularly given that the terms are still difficult to define. 
  
 The ILO produces a factsheet on forced labor but does not collect systematic data on the 
prevalence of forced labor by country. However, the ILO does compile records on legal and 
regulatory changes that countries make regarding forced labor, made available through the 
Annual Review. This information is not necessarily complete but provides one source of 
consistent data at the country level.  
 
 In addition to the ILO, the International Organization for Migration provides information 
on forced labor: in particular, on trafficking in persons. The organization has been working to 
develop a database for policy and research purposes. Data is collected through individual cases, 
and so the tool seems less effective for measuring progress by country as countries with more 
cases may simply reflect better reporting or monitoring (Counter-Trafficking Database, 78 
Countries, 1999-2006). 
 
 The U.S. State Department also collects data on forced and compulsory labor, including 
trafficking in persons, in its annual Human Rights reports. It also produces Trafficking in 
Persons Reports. Recently, the UN launched a Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN 
GIFT).  The UN has provided some data on human trafficking by country, although it is only 
available for 2009.  
 
 The Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards recommends four criteria 
for the legal framework for forced labor, eight for government performance and four for 
outcomes.  
 
2.4 Non-Discrimination and Equal Pay 
 
 The final two ILO core standards are the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
(Convention 100) and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 
(Convention 111). These may be the most difficult to measure, given the broad scope and data 
challenges. The ILO states that Convention 100 applies to all private and public sectors workers, 
and establishes principles for establishing national policy that strives to attain equal pay for equal 
work for men and women.  
 
 Adequate measures of pay differentials by gender and race must take account factors 
such as industry, occupation, job training, skill level and local labor market. Economists debate 
whether the remaining gaps are due to discrimination or due to unobservable abilities, risk of 
exiting the labor market for childbearing, or other factors not explained in most models. There is 
no consensus for a universal methodology for measuring the gender or racial wage gap. Further 
complicating the challenge is that many countries do not collect data on race. Those that do don’t 
share the same definitions and categories.  
 
 Similarly, there is no consensus on how to measure discrimination in employment 
relationships, which could refer to hiring, firing, discipline, and promotions. In addition, 
Convention 111 lists seven types of discrimination, including race, color, sex, religion, political 
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opinion, national extraction or social origin. Even more than agreement on methodology, 
scholarship is hindered by the challenges of consistent data collection. 
 
 Furthermore, in many countries the majority of women work as self-employed in the 
informal sector and don’t have formal wage data to report. Most studies of discrimination focus 
primarily on wage differentials, and this would exclude these women from consideration. A 
strong measure would have to find a way to include self-employed informal sector workers and 
raise larger questions about structural bias or institutional discrimination rather than individual 
acts of discrimination. 
 
 Due to these challenges, there are no consistent and comprehensive indices available to 
measure compliance with Conventions 100 and 111 on a global scale. However, some 
information on these dimensions is available. The main datasources include the U.S. State 
Department Human Rights reports and the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations. 
 
 Constance Thomas of the ILO noted that the ILO considers these three indicators as key 
steps towards compliance with the non-discrimination convention:  
 
1. the country recognizes the problem (in reports to the ILO); 
2. the country does research to identify where discrimination exists and how it is 
manifested; and 
3. the country allows an NGO to study the problem. (Hilton 2003). 
 
The ILO relies on various country reports, as well as country reports submitted to the UN’s 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, established in 1979. Some 
countries sometimes provide more comprehensive and accurate information on discrimination in 
their UN CEDAW reports than they do in their ILO reports (Hilton 2003).  
 
 The Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards recommends 31 criteria to 
measure compliance with discrimination and equal pay. In addition, they recommend four 
associated factors that may be relevant: a country’s ranking on the UN Human Development 
Index minus its ranking on the gender development index; fertility rates; labor force participation 
by various categories such as gender; and the distribution of part-time work.  
 
2.4 Decent Work 
 
 In addition to the above areas of core ILO conventions, some researchers have also tried 
to measure indicators of “decent work” in countries. The ILO has developed the concept of 
decent work to go beyond the core conventions and promote a proactive vision of work, and has 
urged national and regional bodies to work towards methodologies to measure this concept. ILO 
staff has attempted to develop indicators that could be use to evaluate conditions in countries 
Anker et al (2002) select ten aspects of decent work and provide preliminary thoughts on how 
these might be measured. These aspects include employment opportunities, unacceptable work, 
adequate earnings and productive earnings, decent hours, stability and security of work, 
balancing work and family life, fair treatment in employment, safe work, social protection, social 
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dialogue and workplace protection, and the economic and social context of decent work. Each 
aspect would be comprised of several different indicators.   
 
 The Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards developed indicators to 
measure “acceptable conditions of work.” This includes 19 criteria for the legal framework, 
including national law establishing a minimum wage, national laws or regulations establishing a 
regular workweek of 48 hours a week or less, and the adoption of several ILO conventions. The 
measure should also include 13 indicators of government performance and five for outcomes. 
 
 In 2008, the ILO held a Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Measurement of Decent 
Work and affirmed that “Decent work indicators should capture all four dimensions of the 
concept of decent work, namely: (1) labour standards and fundamental principles and rights at 
work; (2) employment opportunities; (3) social protection; and (4) social dialogue.” In a 
discussion paper for the meeting the ILO reviews seven efforts to measure decent work, 
including some by ILO regional offices as well as some by other bodies, such as the UN 
measurements of progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals. The paper notes 
that there is significant overlap in the methodologies by these seven papers and concludes that 
the end measurement should include statistical indicators as well information on the legal rights 
and structures by country. The 18th International Conference of Labour Statisticians concluded 
that the ILO should continue work on developing indicators, working to refine measurements for 
pilot countries (ILO 2008). 
 
 
2.5 Comprehensive Measures 
 
 Scholars acknowledge the challenges of measuring any of the labor standards 
individually. To date, no one has developed a comprehensive measure of all eight ILO standards 
together plus measures of decent work. In addition to the 151 criteria it proposes for five 
categories of standards, the Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards developed a 
hypothetical framework for evaluating each country in terms of compliance, by using a three by 
three matrix that would allow analysts to place each standard within a box, for each country. One 
axis would assess whether there were “some problems,” “extensive problems,” or “severe 
problem” with a standard, and the other axis would measure whether conditions were 
“improving,” in a “steady state,” or “worsening.” This matrix could be used to evaluate the core 
ILO standards, as well as additional standards such as decent working conditions.  
 
 A team of researchers evaluated the NAS-ILAB matrix in a report for ILAB in 2009, and 
found that the matrix may provide a useful tool but could use revisions to improve problems in 
coding and measurement (Root and Verloren 2009). In particular, Root and Verloen found a 
good deal of variation in measures done by different evaluators. In many cases, there was little 
consensus between three evaluators on particular scores. This improved, but was not solved, with 
discussion between evaluators. 
 
 In addition to the NAS-ILAB measure, the non-profit organization Vérité has developed 
several methods for measuring labor standards. Their most comprehensive was developed for the 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). CalPERS contracted with Vérité in 
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2000 to create a system to measure labor standards in 27 countries where CalPERS was investing 
(or considering investing) in. The Vérité index measures four components, developing a score 
from one to 40. The indicators include ratification of ILO core conventions; laws and legal 
system; institutional capacity; and implementation effectiveness.  They rely on a wide range of 
public and private sources, ranging from ILO, UNDP and IMF reports to reviews by NGOs.  
Vérité also notes that they utilize information collected from their own experience conducting 
factory monitoring in countries around the world.  
 
Vérité has developed scores for 27 countries for years since 2000. Of the 27 countries, six 
have FTAs with the US: Chile, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco and Peru. Two countries: 
Colombia and Korea (Republic of)5 - have FTAs that have been signed by the President but are 
not ratified by Congress. 
  
 In Table 1, we provide a summary of main data sources available to measure the eight 
core standards. This is not an exhaustive list, but includes major sources that would most likely 
be utilized in any comprehensive index. 
                                                 
5 We will use Korea as a shorthand for Republic of Korea throughout this report. 
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Table 1: Data Sources on ILO Core Standards 
 
Standard Source Years Countries 
Freedom of association 
and collective 
bargaining 
US State Department Human 
Rights Reports 
Annual* All 
 ILO Freedom of Association 
Supervisory Reports 
Ad hoc** Ad hoc 
 ICFTU/ITUC Annual Survey of 
Violations of Trade Union Rights
Annual All 
 Freedom House, Civil Liberties 
Index 
Annual All 
Minimum age of work 
and Worst Forms of 
Child Labor 
US State Department Human 
Rights Reports 
Annual All 
 ILO, SIMPOC surveys Varies  Over 40 countries 
 ILO, Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations 
Ad hoc Ad hoc 
 US Department of Labor, ILAB Annual since 2001 All countries with 
trade agreements 
with US 
 World Bank, Living Standards 
Measurement Survey 
Varies Some developing 
countries 
 UNICEF, Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys 
Varies. Will go to 
every 3 years with 
current round of 
surveys 
Over 50 countries 
Forced labor and Slave 
Labor 
US State Department Human 
Rights Reports 
Annual All 
 ILO Annual Review Annual Varies 
 ILO, Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations 
Ad hoc Ad hoc 
 UN Global Initiative to Fight 
Human Trafficking 
2009 (data for 2003-
2007) 
155 
 International Organization for 
Migration 
Quarterly  
Non-discrimination 
and Equal Pay 
US State Department Human 
Rights Reports (not consistent) 
Some Some 
 ILO, Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations 
Ad hoc Ad hoc 
 UN Committee on the 
Elimination of  all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
Periodic (irregular 
intervals) 
Some 
* Reports refer to events for the prior year. For example, the report released in 2009 refers to 
events for 2008. 
** Cases may last for many years; multiple reports may exist for the same complaint. 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
 
 There are few sources for labor standards compliance that are available on an annual 
basis. As mentioned above, the only comprehensive measure that has been developed for more 
than one year is the index created by Vérité. However, this is only for a limited time frame, and 
does not cover all countries with FTAs. Our study attempts to construct a measure that will allow 
us to track changes in the presence and application of standards from year to year, to see if there 
were patterns related to trade agreement negotiations. 
 
 It is beyond the scope of this project to produce a measure evaluating all core labor 
standards and decent work. Instead, we focused on an annual measure of FA/CB. Building off of 
the Kucera index of trade union rights we develop an annual measure of compliance with the 
FA/CB core labor standards. Our measure does not contain as many indicators as Kucera’s, but 
is collected by year, allowing us to produce a measure that lets us see changes within a country 
over time.  
 
 We constructed our own annual index of labor standards for countries with which the 
U.S. has negotiated an FTA. This is not as straightforward as it may sound as the FTA process 
has many stages. In many cases, the US first negotiates a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement (TIFA) before beginning to negotiate an FTA. FTA negotiations may start and stop, 
such as they did between the US and Chile throughout the 1990s. The parameters of the 
negotiations are governed in the US by US Trade Law and the existence of so-called “Fast Track 
Authority.” When Fast-Track is in place, the US President is authorized to negotiate an 
agreement and present it to Congress for a yes or no vote. However, this still entails a number of 
steps. The President (through the US Trade Representative) announces intentions to negotiate an 
FTA. The countries engage in rounds of negotiations, and is successful, sign an initial agreement. 
That agreement is then made available to the public for comment. Formal committees, such as 
the Labor Advisory Committee, are required to comment within a specified time period. The 
agreement also goes to the Senate and House committees for hearings. The Senate and House 
must pass legislation to enact and implement the agreements. If this happens, the legislation goes 
back to the President to sign. The partner country may also have similar processes to get the final 
agreement implemented. The agreement may be approved but not come into force right away. 
This means that the entire process of negotiating an FTA may go quickly or take many years.  
 
 In this study, we attempt to examine the relationship between FTA negotiations and 
changes to labor standards in partner countries. Our hypothesis is that the process of negotiations 
may put pressure on partner countries to improve their standards. Therefore we look at trends in 
the annual labor standards index to observe whether standards improve during the initial rounds 
of negotiations; during the period after the initial agreement is signed by the US President but 
before the FTA is passed by Congress; and the period after the final FTA is ratified by the US. 
 
 In addition to measuring labor standards in the countries, we reviewed the reports 
submitted by the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC) to the USTR. These reports allow us to 
identify the concerns that emerge before the FTA is ratified. Of course, it is not clear that all 
issues raised by the LAC were then presented as stipulations of an agreement in FTA 
 15
negotiations. However this provides us with a detailed picture of labor experts’ independent 
assessment of conditions in each country and raises potential points of concern that may be 
presented by members of Congress. 
 
 This index is not meant to be a fully standardized measure that would allow comparisons 
between countries. It is too difficult to develop a quantitative measure that would capture the 
complexities of each country’s history and labor relations system. Rather, the measures are best 
suited to tracking changes within countries- to see if a country improves its labor laws and 
regulations over time.  
  
4. Description of Data and Data Collection 
 
 Our index contains observations for 20 criteria, for 19 countries with which the U.S. has 
signed FTAs (but not necessarily ratified). We coded Canada and Mexico but have less 
confidence in the data for these countries as source documents from the 1980s are less complete 
than more recent reports.6 We did not include Israel for several reasons. First, one of our main 
data sources, the ICFTU Annual Survey, began in 1984. This means we did not have a second 
data source for the first three years of our observation period. Second, later reports on Israel 
include information on the Occupied Territories, but there is almost no information available 
before 1988. Due to these data restrictions we omitted Israel from our database. 
 
 Three researchers on our team reviewed State Department reports, ICFTU reports, ILO 
reports, and existing literature on measurement of labor standards.7 From this, we selected 14 
variables from Kucera’s 2006 index. These 14 criteria (listed in Table 2) were selected by us as 
the ones that were most relevant for measuring freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights, and the ones that would be likely to capture the most variation in changes in labor laws 
and standards year by year.  Some of the indicators we selected were among the most commonly 
found in Kucera’s study (such as “arrest…for union activities”), while some were among the 
least common (such as “general prohibitions [on the right to collective bargaining].” We 
included both commonly observed and uncommon indicators to get sufficient variation between 
countries and over time.  
 
                                                 
6 The State Department Human Rights reports only began to include a full section on Worker Rights in 1988. Before 
that, there was limited information on freedom of association and “conditions of labor” in the reports.   
7 The ICFTU began its Annual Survey in 1984 but it was not available on an annual basis until the late 1990s. The 
surveys in the 1980s do not include data on Mexico, and only a few issues contain information on Canada and Israel. 
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Table 2: Measures from Kucera Index Used for Labor Standards Index 
 
Freedom of Association/Collective bargaining related civil liberties 
1 Murder or disappearance of union members or organizers  
2 Other violence against union members or organizers  
3 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, or forced exile for union membership or activities  
4 
Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, free opinion, free 
expression  
Right to establish and join unions and worker organizations 
6 General prohibitions  
15 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from union membership  
16 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from union membership  
Right to bargain collectively 
24 General prohibitions  
29 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain  
30 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to collectively bargain  
Right to strike 
32 General prohibitions  
34 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to strike  
35 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to strike  
Export processing zones 
37 Restricted rights in EPZs 
Note: See Appendix A for more detail on these criteria 
 
 
 After reviewing source material, we added six additional criteria of our own. These 
criteria were developed to measure the potential barriers that workers face when trying to 
exercise their rights.  These six critera include: 
 
1) employer interference with FA/CB;  
2) government barriers to FA/CB;  
3) employer interference with right to strike;  
4) government barriers to right to strike; 
5) foreign worker barriers to FA; 
6) enforcement capacity/mechanisms for enforcement of FA/CB rights 
 
Each of the criteria was developed based on review of the Kucera criteria as well as the 
Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards (CMILS) criteria, and in some cases is 
an amalgam of some of these items. We included employer interference in our index because this 
is a frequent way in which workers are impeded from exercising their rights. The ability of 
employers to interfere with FA/CB is partially a function of laws and enforcement, but also the 
culture of labor relations within a country. We included a criteria relating to the rights of foreign 
workers as this is an item that came up frequently in LAC reports. 
 
 We coded these six criteria according to the guidelines presented in Appendix B. In 
Appendix C, we offer a table which compares our criteria to the Kucera index and the CMILS 
criteria for FA/CB. 
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 We compiled the U.S. Department of State Human Rights reports for the three years 
before the formal negotiations began in each FTA, and then reviewed every subsequent year for 
10 years. This provides some countries with as many as 11 years of data: the initial year of 
observation plus the following ten years. Note that we were only able to collect a full eleven 
year’s worth of data for seven countries (ones with FTAs negotiated prior to 2003). For countries 
with more recent FTAs, a full 11 years worth of data is not available. For Korea, the most recent 
FTA partner, we have only seven years of observations. 
 
 We did the same with the ICFTU/ITUC reports, collecting data for each year in question. 
We read every report and used the information to code each country, for all relevant years. We 
then read through all Freedom of Association complaints filed with the ILO for that time period. 
Following Kucera, we coded them for the year he complaint was initially filed. 
 
ICFTU Annual Surveys are available on-line from 1999. For earlier years, we received 
hardcopies directly from the ITUC. ICFTU began its Annual Survey in 1984, so it was not 
possible to get reports for the first years of our time period for Israel. State Department Human 
Rights reports are available on-line from 1998 to the present. Earlier reports are available 
electronically directly through the State Department library, or through the HeinOnline database. 
 
 We used the same guidelines as Kucera when operationalizing each criteria (see Kucera 
2007 for more details). This includes using common coding definitions (such as “murder of trade 
unionist” includes murder of family member); as well as coding decisions. For example, when 
there was conflicting information within one report we took a conservative approach and did not 
counted that as an incident. 
 
 Unlike Kucera, we coded some items as “not applicable” (NA). For example, if a country 
did not allow the right to form unions, we coded “arrest of union members” as NA. Similarly, if 
a country does not have export processing zones we coded “restricted rights in EPZs” as NA as it 
is not usually possible to restrict rights that do not exist. Of course, there are cases where trade 
unions are not legalized and governments arrest workers who try to form unions or who go on 
strike. However, for the countries in our database we felt that coding items as NA allowed a 
more accurate measure of the FA/CB rights within a country. This is in part because we did not 
find any evidence of violations for the criteria in question. For example, we did not find cases of 
workers being murdered for trade union activity in countries where unions were not allowed.  
 
 In Kucera’s index, countries such as Bahrain and Oman that had very restricted rights 
showed up with low total scores as they do not show up as violating laws.  In our total score, we 
removed the items with NA from the denominator to get a more accurate measure of labor 
standards compliance.  
 
 Otherwise, we coded each item as a ‘1’ if problems existed for that year, and a ‘0’ if there 
were not problems. In addition, we included a ‘+’ to each criteria to show if there were 
significant improvements from one year to the next, and a ‘-‘ to show if things got worse in that 
measure. If there was evidence that some things improved while others got worse within a 
criteria, we did not assign a plus or minus. This was the case in some countries where labor law 
reforms made have reduced some barriers to FA/CB but increased others. 
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.   
 We relied on a few additional sources beyond our primary sources to fill in missing 
information. We reviewed the NATLEX database and reports from the AFL-CIO Solidarity 
Center, Human Rights Watch, Congressional Research Service and newspaper articles to help fill 
gaps or clarify vague information from our primary sources.  For example, the 2010 State 
Department report for Peru mentions Legislative Decree 728, which restricts the freedom of 
association for workers in many nontraditional export sectors, such as fishing. None of the prior 
State Department or ICFTU reports mention this decree. In cases like this we consulted 
documents available through the ILO NATLEX database, as well as a report from the AFL-CIO 
Solidarity Center. In the case of Peru’s Decree 728 we gathered new information which allowed 
us to go back and recode the criteria for “Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from union 
membership” for each year since the Decree was passed.  
 
 We note that each data source had weaknesses. For example, the NATLEX database is 
several years out of date for some countries so we primarily used that for historical records.8 The 
AFL-CIO Solidarity Center country reports only cover a few countries, and are not available on 
an annual basis. 
 
 For each country, we coded as many indicators as possible, for each year in the 11 year 
time frame. Then, we totaled the scores and created a composite measure by country for each 
year (Total1). Specifically, for each year a country could receive a score of 0 (no reports of 
problems) to 20 (reports of problems in each criteria).  
 
 To adjust for scores of “not applicable” we adjusted the Total1 score by the ratio of total 
to observable criteria. For example, if a country had five criteria coded as NA in a year, we 
multiplied Total1 by (20/15). This is provided in the Total1-adjusted score. 
 
 In addition to the 20 criteria, we then used the looked at whether a country had ratified 
the two fundamental ILO conventions relating to FA/CB: Conventions 87 and 98. We added the 
number of conventions not ratified at the time. A score of two indicates neither convention was 
ratified; a score of zero means both fundamental conventions were ratified. We coded this in a 
negative way (rather than a positive coding of the core conventions ratified) so that our scale was 
consistent with scale for the other criteria. We calculated a second total score including this 
information (Total2).9  
 
 Following Kucera, we then normalized the Total1-adjusted and Total2 scores to a 
maximum of 10 (and a minimum score of 0). We did this by taking each country score by year, 
dividing it by the maximum value for all countries and all years, and multiplying by ten. 
Normalizing allows us to standardize the scores for a common index, for easier comparison 
                                                 
8 However, we did find 2009 and 2010 information available for a handful of our countries: Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Singapore. Not all of these updates were related to freedom of 
association but it suggests that the database is more up-to-date than it has been in the past. 
9 We also calculated this score looking at all eight fundamental conventions, but then did not include these findings 
in the final report as it seems possible the index could be easily skewed by including conventions not related to 
FA/CB. 
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across countries. Although we do not believe that the index should be used to compare country 
versus country, using a common index makes it easier to see patterns within countries over time. 
Otherwise, countries that begin with much higher scores may appear to make greater changes 
over time than do countries that begin with low scores.  
 
 Finally, we calculated a weighted measure, giving certain criteria greater emphasis in the 
total index. In the first calculation, we assign a greater weight to five criteria: general 
prohibitions on freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, and right to strike, 
government barriers to FA/CB, and murder of trade unionists. These criteria are weighted at 
twice the value of the other 15 criteria. As some critics have noted about the Kucera index, the 
weights are somewhat arbitrary, as we could have assigned other weights (e.g. of 1.5 or 3). 
Because these weights are transparent, users can easily change the weighting scheme to develop 
a different index. For the weighted total, scores can now range from 0 (for a country with 0s 
recorded for each criteria), to 25 (for a country with all 1s for each of the 20 criteria, and double 
weights for 5 of those criteria). This is presented as the Weighted1 score. 
 
 In the second calculation, we give each criterion the same base weight but we adjust the 
weighting based on the plus or minus coding. Each item with a positive change gets 0.5 deducted 
from the total score. Each item with a negative change adds 0.5 to the total. This provides a more 
nuanced total score for each country in each year, essentially placing value on the positive or 
negative trends year to year. For example, some countries have high government barriers to 
FA/CB, which will result in a score of 1 for a given criteria. But even within that context, 
conditions can worsen from one year to the next. The application of barriers may become tighter, 
or the number of trade union arrests may increase significantly. In these cases we score the 
country as a 1, but code it as a negative change, thereby giving a weighted score of 1.5 for that 
year. In this case, the total score can now range from -10 (for a country with all 0s and positive 
change in each of the 10 criteria), up to 30 (for a country with all 1s, and negative change for 
each criteria). This is presented as the Weighted2 score. Again, it is possible to adjust these 
weights to something other than 0.5.  
 
 The measure for Weighted2 is asymmetric, which will give more spread about the bad 
cases but having no impact on the good cases. The second weighting is not asymmetric in 
principle but in practice it may show more spread among the bad cases, since if a country is 
already performing very well there will not be much room for improvement. On the other hand, 
it is possible that countries that are performing very poorly may not be coded as moving in a 
negative direction. 
 
 We then normalized the Weighted1 and Weighted2 scores to 10, using the same approach 
as discussed above. For each country, we provide four scores, all normalized: Total1-adjusted, 
Total2 (with ILO conventions), Weighted1 and Weighted2.  
 
 We then calculated various measures to see changes over time. Our measures of change 
include the following: 
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1) absolute change in index from three years before negotiations begin to the year when the 
U.S. president signs an act implementing the FTA (for the three FTA that have not been 
approved by Congress we use 2009 as the end year) 
2) percentage change in index over the 11 year time period 
 
 The labor standards index ranges from 0 to 10, with a high number representing more 
problems with the labor standards criteria. For each of the calculations, a negative number 
represents positive change: it shows that a country moved from more problems to fewer 
problems with labor standards within the time period. A positive number represents increasing 
problems with labor standards, and therefore an overall deterioration. 
 
 We were most interested in seeing if labor standards improved during the process of 
negotiation. Specifically, this covers changes made in rounds of trade negotiations as well as 
changes made after the FTA is signed but is not yet ratified. 
 
 We caution readers that the indices created are most useful for tracking changes within a 
country over time, rather than comparing countries. Due to the substantial differences in labor 
law, industrial relations history, and political context of each country it is difficult to capture 
labor standards with a single number for each criterion. Therefore a score of ‘1’ in a cell for one 
country may not carry the same meaning as the same score in another country. 
 
5. Results 
 
 First we provide the Total1-adjusted (normalized) scores for each country, sorted from 
highest to lowest. This is not done to suggest ranking between countries but to show which 
countries begin with the highest (worst) measures. Countries that begin the time period with high 
measures have the most room for improvement. These scores are provided in Table 3a, sorted by 
the index for Year1. 
 Oman begins the highest score (worst standards), followed by Colombia. Mexico and 
Canada show the lowest score (best standards), but we caution again that the data for the early 
years of Mexico and Canada was very weak. 
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Table 3a: Total1-Adjusted Index for all Countries, Sorted from High to Low for Year1 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
Oman 9.80 9.80 9.80 9.80 9.80 3.72 5.57 3.72 2.48     
Colombia 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 6.47 7.06   
Costa Rica 7.06 4.12 4.71 6.47 7.06 5.88 7.06 5.88 5.88 5.88  
Guatemala 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 7.06  
Panama 7.06 8.82 8.24 5.88 5.88 8.82 10.00 10.00 8.82   
Bahrain 6.54 8.40 2.35 3.53 4.12 4.12 4.12 5.88 5.88 5.29  
Chile 6.47 5.88 4.71 7.06 7.65 6.47 7.06 7.06 4.12 4.12 8.24
E.Salvador 6.47 4.71 5.29 5.88 6.47 5.88 5.29 6.47 4.12 3.53  
Korea 6.47 7.06 7.65 7.65 7.06 7.65 6.47     
Peru 6.47 5.29 7.65 6.47 7.06 5.88 8.24 8.24 8.24 5.88  
D.Republic 5.29 4.71 4.12 4.71 5.88 4.71 5.88 4.12 2.94 4.12  
Morocco 4.71 4.71 4.71 2.35 7.06 7.06 7.65 7.06 7.65 6.47  
Honduras 4.12 2.94 2.94 2.35 5.29 3.53 5.29 5.88 4.71 5.88  
Nicaragua 4.12 3.53 4.71 4.71 5.29 3.53 5.88 4.12 4.71 4.71  
Jordan 3.53 3.53 4.12 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 4.12 5.29 5.88 5.29
Australia 3.10 5.57 4.33 4.95 3.72 4.33 4.95 6.19 4.95 5.57 4.95
Singapore 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.72 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33
Mexico 2.94 2.35 5.29 7.65 5.29 6.47 4.71 4.12 5.29 4.71 4.71
Canada 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.76 2.35 1.76 2.48 3.72 3.72 3.72
 
 
 We also provide Total2, Weighted1 and Weighted2 normalized scores for the same 
period, sorted from highest to lowest. These are presented in Tables 3b, 3c and 3d. For the most 
part, the patterns are similar with a few exceptions. Korea shows up worse, and Australia better, 
under the Total2 index. This represents the differences based on the ILO ratifications.  Panama 
shows a worse score in both Weighted indices. El Salvador measures with worse labor standards 
under Weighted2, which accounts for degree of change. Bahrain shows a negative score in Year3 
for the Weighted2 index. This represents the year when the country made major changes to its 
labor law.  
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Table 3b: Total2 Index for all Countries, Sorted from High to Low for Year1 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
Oman 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 4.45 6.15 4.45 3.33     
Bahrain 7.02 8.72 3.21 4.29 4.82 4.82 4.82 6.43 6.43 5.89  
Chile 6.96 6.43 4.29 6.43 6.96 5.89 6.43 6.43 3.75 3.75 7.50
E.Salvador 6.96 5.36 5.89 6.43 6.96 6.43 4.82 5.89 3.75 3.21  
Korea 6.96 7.50 8.04 8.04 7.50 8.04 6.96     
Colombia 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 5.89 6.43   
Costa Rica 6.43 3.75 4.29 5.89 6.43 5.36 6.43 5.36 5.36 5.36  
Guatemala 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.89 6.43  
Panama 6.43 8.04 7.50 5.36 5.36 8.04 9.11 9.11 8.04   
Peru 5.89 4.82 6.96 5.89 6.43 5.36 7.50 7.50 7.50 5.36  
D.Republic 4.82 4.29 3.75 4.29 5.36 4.29 5.36 3.75 2.68 3.75  
Morocco 4.82 4.82 4.82 2.68 6.96 6.96 7.50 6.96 7.50 6.43  
Honduras 3.75 2.68 2.68 2.14 4.82 3.21 4.82 5.36 4.29 5.36  
Jordan 3.75 3.75 4.29 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.29 5.36 5.89 5.36
Nicaragua 3.75 3.21 4.29 4.29 4.82 3.21 5.36 3.75 4.29 4.29  
Mexico 3.21 2.68 5.36 7.50 5.36 6.43 4.82 4.29 5.36 4.82 4.82
Singapore 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.75 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29
Australia 2.82 5.08 3.95 4.51 3.38 3.95 4.51 5.64 4.51 5.08 4.51
Canada 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61 2.14 2.68 2.14 2.79 3.92 3.92 3.92
 
 
Table 3c: Weighted1 Index for all Countries, Sorted from High to Low for Year1 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
Oman 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 3.21 5.33 3.21 2.14     
Panama 7.63 6.61 8.14 7.63 5.08 5.08 8.14 9.66 9.66   
Bahrain 7.18 8.79 2.03 3.05 3.56 3.56 3.56 5.08 5.08 4.58  
Colombia 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 6.10 7.12   
Costa Rica 7.12 4.07 4.58 6.10 6.61 5.59 6.61 5.59 5.59 5.59   
Guatemala 7.12 7.12 7.12 6.61 7.12 6.61 6.10 6.61 6.61 7.12  
Chile 6.10 5.59 4.58 6.61 7.63 6.10 6.61 6.61 3.56 3.56 8.14
E.Salvador 6.10 4.58 5.08 5.59 6.61 5.59 5.08 6.61 4.07 3.05  
Peru 6.10 5.08 7.12 6.10 6.61 5.59 8.14 8.14 8.14 5.59  
Korea 5.59 6.61 7.63 7.63 6.61 7.12 6.10     
D.Republic 5.08 4.58 3.56 4.07 5.59 4.58 6.10 4.07 2.54 3.56  
Morocco 4.58 4.58 4.58 4.58 2.03 6.61 6.61 7.63 6.61 7.63   
Honduras 4.07 3.05 3.05 2.03 5.08 3.56 5.08 6.10 4.58 6.10  
Jordan 3.56 3.56 4.07 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 4.07 5.08 5.59 5.59
Nicaragua 3.56 3.56 4.07 4.58 5.08 3.05 5.59 4.07 4.58 4.58  
Australia 3.18 5.33 4.26 4.79 3.72 4.26 5.30 6.37 5.30 5.83 4.79
Mexico 3.05 2.54 5.08 7.63 5.08 6.10 5.08 4.07 5.08 4.58 5.08
Singapore 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.56 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07
Canada 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.53 2.03 1.53 2.14 3.21 3.72 3.72
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Table 3d: Weighted2 Index for all Countries, Sorted from High to Low for Year1 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
Oman 8.13 8.13 7.15 8.13 8.13 1.62 4.62 3.08 2.30     
Panama 6.83 5.85 7.56 7.07 4.88 4.88 7.32 10.00 8.29   
E.Salvador 6.34 4.63 5.61 6.10 6.83 5.37 4.15 5.61 2.44 2.44  
Colombia 5.85 5.85 6.59 6.83 5.85 6.10 6.34 5.12 6.10   
Costa Rica 5.85 3.41 4.15 5.12 6.10 5.37 6.59 5.85 5.85 5.12   
Guatemala 5.85 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 3.14  
Bahrain 5.42 6.72 -1.22 2.68 3.41 3.17 2.93 4.88 4.88 4.15  
Chile 5.37 4.63 3.90 5.61 6.34 4.88 6.10 5.61 3.17 3.41 7.56
Korea 5.37 5.85 6.34 6.34 6.10 6.59 6.59     
Peru 5.12 3.66 5.85 5.37 5.85 4.88 7.07 7.80 8.29 5.37  
D.Republic 4.39 4.15 3.17 4.15 5.37 3.17 4.88 2.68 1.95 3.90  
Morocco 3.90 6.10 5.12 3.66 1.46 6.10 6.34 6.83 6.10 5.85   
Honduras 3.41 1.95 2.68 1.46 5.61 2.20 4.39 5.12 3.41 5.37  
Nicaragua 3.41 2.68 4.39 3.66 4.63 2.20 5.61 2.68 4.15 3.90  
Jordan 2.93 2.93 3.41 2.68 2.93 2.93 2.93 3.66 4.88 5.37 4.15
Australia 2.57 4.62 3.35 3.62 3.81 4.33 4.84 5.13 4.11 4.62 3.38
Mexico 2.44 1.95 4.39 6.10 4.39 5.37 3.90 3.66 4.88 4.39 3.66
Singapore 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.20 3.41 3.90 3.41 3.41 3.41
Canada 0.98 0.98 1.22 0.73 1.71 2.68 2.20 2.30 3.57 3.08 2.35
 
 
 In Table 4 we present results for 19 countries, for Total1-adjusted, Total2, Weighted1 and 
Weighted2, all normalized to a 1 to 10 scale. We show absolute changes in scores from three 
years before the start of negotiations to ratification of the FTA. 
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Table 4: Changes in Indices (Normalized) for 19 countries;  
Three Years before Negotiation to Ratification 
 
 Total1 adj. Total2 Weighted1 Weighted2 
Australia 1.24 1.13 1.07 1.76
Bahrain -2.42 -2.20 -3.62 -2.25
Canada 1.18 1.07 1.02 1.71
Chile 0.59 -0.54 0.51 0.73
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
Costa Rica -1.18 -1.07 -1.53 -0.49
Dominican Republic -0.59 -0.54 -0.51 -1.22
El Salvador -0.59 -0.54 -0.51 -0.98
Guatemala -0.59 -0.54 -0.51 -2.98
Honduras -0.59 -0.54 -0.51 -1.22
Jordan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.51 1.22
Mexico 1.76 1.61 2.03 1.46
Morocco 7.06 6.96 2.03 1.46
Nicaragua -0.59 -0.54 -0.51 -1.22
Oman -4.23 -3.85 -4.67 -3.51
Panama 1.76 1.61 2.03 1.46
Peru 1.76 1.61 2.03 2.68
Singapore 0.62 0.54 0.51 0.98
Note: Negative scores show improvement in labor standards; Positive scores show deteriorating standard 
 
 Of the 19 countries, eight countries show improvement in all four measures during the 
time period. Oman and Bahrain show significant improvement (This is shown by larger negative 
scores). In addition we see improvements in all measures for all DR-CAFTA countries (Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), although these 
are smaller than those in Oman and Bahrain: only in a few cases do the DR-CAFTA countries 
show improvement of more than one point.  
 
 We then examine changes in labor standards over the eleven year time period (Table 5). 
Five countries show an overall improvement in labor standards over the full time period 
according to all four measures. These countries are Bahrain, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador and Oman. Peru shows improvement in three of the four measures, although the 
improvements are modest. On the other end, Australia, Canada, Chile, Honduras, Jordan, 
Mexico, Morocco, Panama and Singapore primarily show deterioration in labor standards over 
this period. (We note again that data on Mexico and Canada for the early years is very weak. 
This may account for the low scores these countries show in the beginning period since there was 
little information in State Department or ICFTU reports, especially for Mexico). 
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 We point out that for some countries there is strong variation in the different measures, 
suggesting the sensitivity of some methods of coding data. For example, Canada shows 
deteriorating conditions in every measure, but does best with Total2 and Weighted2. Guatemala 
has strong labor standards improvement over the time period when weighting the index by 
strength of changes and no change under the other three measures. 
 
 There is little difference between the Total1 and Total2 scores for most countries. In a 
few cases there is a slight difference which simply represents a larger denominator for Total2, so 
a smaller percentage change. However, for some countries the Total2 index shows much better 
results than Total1, such as Canada and Chile. This shows that certain countries can appear to 
improve labor standards simply through ratification of ILO Conventions. In reality, standards 
may be getting worse but the international community may assume standards are better if the 
country ratifies core conventions. For this reason, we argue that Total1 is a better measure of 
actual labor standards than Total2.  
 
 When we look at the individual trends for each country that we see some complicated 
patterns (see Table 6). For example, three countries made significant improvements in their labor 
standards just before negotiations begin, but then revert back to poor conditions - sometimes 
ending the period worse than they began. This includes Chile, Morocco and Panama. 
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Table 6: Total1-adjusted Scores by Year, Normalized 
Three Years before Negotiations Begin, up to Ten Years After 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
Australia 3.10 5.57 4.33 4.95 3.72 4.33 4.95 6.19 4.95 5.57 4.95
Bahrain 6.54 8.40 2.35 3.53 4.12 4.12 4.12 5.88 5.88 5.29  
Canada 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.76 2.35 1.76 2.48 3.72 3.72 3.72
Chile 6.47 5.88 4.71 7.06 7.65 6.47 7.06 7.06 4.12 4.12 8.24
Colombia 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 6.47 7.06 
Costa Rica 7.06 4.12 4.71 6.47 7.06 5.88 7.06 5.88 5.88 5.88
D.Republic 5.29 4.71 4.12 4.71 5.88 4.71 5.88 4.12 2.94 4.12
El Salvador 6.47 4.71 5.29 5.88 6.47 5.88 5.29 6.47 4.12 3.53
Guatemala 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 7.06
Honduras 4.12 2.94 2.94 2.35 5.29 3.53 5.29 5.88 4.71 5.88
Jordan 3.53 3.53 4.12 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 4.12 5.29 5.88 5.29
Korea 6.47 7.06 7.65 7.65 7.06 7.65 6.47  
Mexico 2.94 2.35 5.29 7.65 5.29 6.47 4.71 4.12 5.29 4.71 4.71
Morocco 4.71 4.71 4.71 2.35 7.06 7.06 7.65 7.06 7.65 6.47
Nicaragua 4.12 3.53 4.71 4.71 5.29 3.53 5.88 4.12 4.71 4.71
Oman 9.80 9.80 9.80 9.80 9.80 3.72 5.57 3.72 2.48 
Panama 7.06 8.82 8.24 5.88 5.88 8.82 10.00 10.00 8.82 
Peru 6.47 5.29 7.65 6.47 7.06 5.88 8.24 8.24 8.24 5.88
Singapore 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.72 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33
 
Notes: 
0 represents no problems with standards; 10 represent many problems 
All countries begin negotiations in Year4. 
Bold highlight notes the year the FTA was signed 
Underline  indicates the year the FTA was ratified in the U.S. 
Bold underline are for countries that signed and ratified in the same year 
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 Table 7a provides the same data but is sorted into three groups: those who end the full 
period better off, those who end worse off, and those with no change. These countries are also 
sorted from high to low Year1 scores within the batches. There are six countries that end the time 
period with improved labor conditions: Oman, Costa Rica, Bahrain, El Salvdador, Peru and 
Dominican Republic. The largest share of countries - ten of the 19 - end the period with worse 
labor standards than when it began. Finally, three countries show no change in labor standards 
from beginning to end.  
 
Table 7a: Total1-adjusted Scores by Year, Normalized 
Three Years before Negotiations Begin, up to Ten Years After 
Sorted by Change from Year1 to Last Year Observed 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
END PERIOD BETTER OFF          
Oman 9.80 9.80 9.80 9.80 9.80 3.72 5.57 3.72 2.48    
Costa Rica 7.06 4.12 4.71 6.47 7.06 5.88 7.06 5.88 5.88 5.88  
Bahrain 6.54 8.40 2.35 3.53 4.12 4.12 4.12 5.88 5.88 5.29  
E.Salvador 6.47 4.71 5.29 5.88 6.47 5.88 5.29 6.47 4.12 3.53  
Peru 6.47 5.29 7.65 6.47 7.06 5.88 8.24 8.24 8.24 5.88  
D.Republic 5.29 4.71 4.12 4.71 5.88 4.71 5.88 4.12 2.94 4.12  
            
END PERIOD WORSE OFF          
Panama 7.06 8.82 8.24 5.88 5.88 8.82 10.00 10.00 8.82   
Chile 6.47 5.88 4.71 7.06 7.65 6.47 7.06 7.06 4.12 4.12 8.24
Morocco 4.71 4.71 4.71 2.35 7.06 7.06 7.65 7.06 7.65 6.47  
Honduras 4.12 2.94 2.94 2.35 5.29 3.53 5.29 5.88 4.71 5.88  
Nicaragua 4.12 3.53 4.71 4.71 5.29 3.53 5.88 4.12 4.71 4.71  
Jordan 3.53 3.53 4.12 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 4.12 5.29 5.88 5.29
Australia 3.10 5.57 4.33 4.95 3.72 4.33 4.95 6.19 4.95 5.57 4.95
Singapore 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.72 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33
Mexico 2.94 2.35 5.29 7.65 5.29 6.47 4.71 4.12 5.29 4.71 4.71
Canada 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.76 2.35 1.76 2.48 3.72 3.72 3.72
            
NO CHANGE           
Colombia 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 6.47 7.06   
Guatemala 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 7.06 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 7.06  
Korea 6.47 7.06 7.65 7.65 7.06 7.65 6.47     
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 The six countries that end the period better off than when they began also have relatively 
higher scores in Year1 than do the countries that had worsening standards. Specifically, the six 
countries had an average index of 6.94 in Year1. For the 10 countries that ended the period with 
worse standards, the average for Year1 was 4.03. This suggests that it may be easier to improve 
labor standards when you begin from a much worse starting point.   
 
 At the same time, countries that begin with low numbers (better standards) appear to 
worsen over time. If we look back at Table 3a, we can see that every country that started in 
Year1 with a score below 5 ended the time with a higher score (worse standards). This includes 
Morocco, Honduras, Nicaragua, Jordan, Australia, Singapore, Mexico and Canada. This pattern 
is even more pronounced under the Weighted1 and Weighted2 indices (seen in Tables 3a and 
3b), with the exception of the Dominican Republican Weighted2 index. 
 
 We provide the same categorization for Weighted1 and Weighted2, in Tables 7b and 7c. 
Again, there is not much difference between these indices and Total1-adjusted but there are some 
minor differences. Weighted1, which counts some criteria as double, shows the same six 
countries as ending off better when then they started. The same ten countries end worse than 
when they started, but we now see Korea as ending worse than it started rather than “no change.” 
In Table 7c we see the same six countries show as ending better than when they started, but now 
all remaining 13 countries show as ending worse than they started. No countries finish with “no 
change.”  
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Table 7b: Weighted1 Scores by Year, Normalized 
Three Years before Negotiations Begin, up to Ten Years After 
Sorted by Change from Year1 to Last Year Observed 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
END PERIOD BETTER OFF          
Oman 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 3.21 5.33 3.21 2.14   
Bahrain 7.18 8.79 2.03 3.05 3.56 3.56 3.56 5.08 5.08 4.58  
Costa Rica 7.12 4.07 4.58 6.10 6.61 5.59 6.61 5.59 5.59 5.59  
E.Salvador 6.10 4.58 5.08 5.59 6.61 5.59 5.08 6.61 4.07 3.05  
Peru 6.10 5.08 7.12 6.10 6.61 5.59 8.14 8.14 8.14 5.59  
D.Republic 5.08 4.58 3.56 4.07 5.59 4.58 6.10 4.07 2.54 3.56  
            
END PERIOD WORSE OFF          
Panama 7.63 6.61 8.14 7.63 5.08 5.08 8.14 9.66 9.66   
Chile 6.10 5.59 4.58 6.61 7.63 6.10 6.61 6.61 3.56 3.56 8.14
Korea 5.59 6.61 7.63 7.63 6.61 7.12 6.10     
Morocco 4.58 4.58 4.58 4.58 2.03 6.61 6.61 7.63 6.61 7.63  
Honduras 4.07 3.05 3.05 2.03 5.08 3.56 5.08 6.10 4.58 6.10  
Jordan 3.56 3.56 4.07 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 4.07 5.08 5.59 5.59
Nicaragua 3.56 3.56 4.07 4.58 5.08 3.05 5.59 4.07 4.58 4.58  
Australia 3.18 5.33 4.26 4.79 3.72 4.26 5.30 6.37 5.30 5.83 4.79
Mexico 3.05 2.54 5.08 7.63 5.08 6.10 5.08 4.07 5.08 4.58 5.08
Singapore 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.56 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07
Canada 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.53 2.03 1.53 2.14 3.21 3.72 3.72
            
NO CHANGE           
Colombia 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 6.10 7.12   
Guatemala 7.12 7.12 7.12 6.61 7.12 6.61 6.10 6.61 6.61 7.12  
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Table 7c: Weighted2 Scores by Year, Normalized 
Three Years before Negotiations Begin, up to Ten Years After 
Sorted by Change from Year1 to Last Year Observed 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Year7 Year8 Year9 Year10 Year11
END PERIOD BETTER OFF          
Oman 8.13 8.13 7.15 8.13 8.13 1.62 4.62 3.08 2.30   
E.Salvador 6.34 4.63 5.61 6.10 6.83 5.37 4.15 5.61 2.44 2.44  
Costa Rica 5.85 3.41 4.15 5.12 6.10 5.37 6.59 5.85 5.85 5.12  
Guatemala 5.85 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 3.14  
Bahrain 5.42 6.72 -1.22 2.68 3.41 3.17 2.93 4.88 4.88 4.15  
D.Republic 4.39 4.15 3.17 4.15 5.37 3.17 4.88 2.68 1.95 3.90  
            
END PERIOD WORSE OFF          
Panama 6.83 5.85 7.56 7.07 4.88 4.88 7.32 10.00 8.29   
Colombia 5.85 5.85 6.59 6.83 5.85 6.10 6.34 5.12 6.10   
Chile 5.37 4.63 3.90 5.61 6.34 4.88 6.10 5.61 3.17 3.41 7.56
Korea 5.37 5.85 6.34 6.34 6.10 6.59 6.59     
Peru 5.12 3.66 5.85 5.37 5.85 4.88 7.07 7.80 8.29 5.37  
Morocco 3.90 6.10 5.12 3.66 1.46 6.10 6.34 6.83 6.10 5.85  
Honduras 3.41 1.95 2.68 1.46 5.61 2.20 4.39 5.12 3.41 5.37  
Nicaragua 3.41 2.68 4.39 3.66 4.63 2.20 5.61 2.68 4.15 3.90  
Jordan 2.93 2.93 3.41 2.68 2.93 2.93 2.93 3.66 4.88 5.37 4.15
Australia 2.57 4.62 3.35 3.62 3.81 4.33 4.84 5.13 4.11 4.62 3.38
Mexico 2.44 1.95 4.39 6.10 4.39 5.37 3.90 3.66 4.88 4.39 3.66
Singapore 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.20 3.41 3.90 3.41 3.41 3.41
Canada 0.98 0.98 1.22 0.73 1.71 2.68 2.20 2.30 3.57 3.08 2.35
 
 
 Colombia is one of the countries that show no change from beginning to end. It is an 
interesting case, as it starts the period as one of the worst countries (Table 3a), suggesting poor 
labor standards. In Tables 4, 5 and 6 we see little change - mostly zeros. This suggests that there 
has been little change in Colombia over the time period - or that any positive changes were 
counter-balanced by negative changes. In fact, a closer look at the country shows that the 
Weighted2 index show more variation over the time period, reflecting in part the increases and 
decreases in violence and murder from year to year. This is an example of why we need 
qualitative analysis in addition to numeric scores to fully understand the variations in each 
country. 
 
 We argue that of the four indices, the two that best reflect changes in labor standards are 
Total1-adjusted and Weighted2. The Total2 index includes changes due to ILO Convention 
ratifications, and this seems to put too much emphasis on the actions of countries rather than the 
deeds. Weighted1 is based on Total1, but weights certain criteria more than others. This may be 
a useful approach but is a bit too subjective. Weighted2 is also based on Total1 but attempts to 
account for positive or negative change from year to year, which is something that was 
recommended for the NAS/ILAB matrix. This allows us to measure changes in certain criteria 
that otherwise would not show change. For example, El Salvador is consistently weak on labor 
law enforcement but they did increase the number of inspectors and engage in some efforts to 
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improve enforcement. This improvement was not enough to go from a ‘1’ to a ‘0’ on 
enforcement, but they do show up as making some positive change under the Weighted2 
measure. 
 
 We plotted the trends in the Total1-adjusted index on graphs to see changes over time. 
We divided the countries into three groups: those negotiated before 2002; those negotiated under 
the 2002 TPA; and those currently pending. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that some countries witness 
a drop in the FA/CB index (suggesting improvement) about mid-way through the observation 
period. This is usually around the time that the FTA is being signed or ratified. However, there is 
great variation in trends and no one pattern seems evident. 
 
Figure 1: Trends in FA/CB Index, FTAs Negotiated before 2002 (Total1-adjusted index) 
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Figure 2: Trends in FA/CB Index, FTAs Negotiated under the 2002 TPA, Currently in 
Force (Total1-adjusted index) 
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Figure 3: Trends in FA/CB Index, FTAs Currently Signed but not Ratified, 
(Total1-adjusted index) 
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 The fluctuations in the indices, along with documentary evidence from annual reports, 
suggests the following possible pattern. Countries with very few labor rights may enact a series 
of reforms, legalizing trade unions and collective bargaining. This would show up as a dramatic 
improvement in standards. As workers begin to exercise their rights, governments and/or 
employers may put up some resistance, thereby reducing access to those rights. Furthermore, 
courts may make rulings, and governments may issue reforms or regulations that further restrict 
those rights.  
 
 Let us examine this hypothesis further. There are 14 countries that begin in Year1 with a 
Total1-adjusted score of 4 or higher, suggesting weak or poor labor standards. Three of these 
countries do not have a ratified FTA, and one was only ratified in 2009 (Oman). The FTA for 
Costa Rica was ratified in 2005 but didn’t go into force until 2009. Without these five countries 
there are nine countries with ratified FTAs that begin the period with relatively poor standards. 
Of these nine, Bahrain, Honduras and Morocco reflect the pattern suggested above: strong 
improvement in labor standards from Year 1 until negotiations start, then a worsening of 
standards by the end of the 11 year observation period. Chile shows strong improvement until 
just before negotiations begin, then gets worse, then better, then much worse in the most recent 
year of observation. 
 
 With only 17 FTAs ratified, and with some only in force very recently, it is difficult to 
determine clear patterns. Further research is needed - perhaps by expanding the database to 
include FTAs between the EU and other countries. In the meantime, we offer case studies to 
better understand the fluctuations in indices within countries. Case studies can provide the 
qualitative context that allows us to understand the trends observed in FA/CB rights.  
 
 
6. Case Studies 
 
 After constructing the index, we examined countries for which there was a significant 
improvement in labor standards during the time period of FTA negotiations. As mentioned 
above, the countries that appear to have made the most significant improvements from three 
years before negotiations until the FTA was first signed are Bahrain and Oman. We also provide 
case studies for two additional countries that appeared to make significant changes in their 
standards around the time of FTA negotiation but then reverted to lower standards: Chile and 
Morocco. Finally, we provide an examination of a DR-CAFTA country, as all showed 
improvements in labor standards in Table 4. We look at El Salvador, as it is one of the countries 
that shows improvement and was the first country to implement DR-CAFTA.  
 
 For each case, we provide initial background on the FTA and labor conditions in the 
country. We then review concerns raised by the ILO, the Labor Advisory Committee to the 
USTR, or other bodies about labor laws and standards in the country. The case studies then 
describe the trade negotiation process as it relates to labor standards reforms.  
 
 In addition to the sources used in the index, we consulted Labor Advisory Committee 
reports submitted to the USTR, as well as any related documents (such as responses from the 
USTR to the LAC report). We reviewed the labor laws and labor standards in each country, 
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based on documents available through the ILO NATLEX, as well as recommendations and 
observations from the Committee of Experts at the ILO, based on documents available through 
ILOLEX. We obtained documents related to the FTAs and rounds of negotiations from the SICE 
foreign trade information website, run by the Organization of American States 
(http://www.sice.oas.org/). Finally, we conducted searches in Lexis, Westlaw, and other 
electronic databases for media reports, journal articles, and congressional hearing transcripts 
related to the countries.  
 
 Timelines of major events in each country are presented in Appendix D. 
  
6.1  Bahrain 
 
 The U.S. and Bahrain signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2002. 
This set the stage to negotiate an FTA, which they formally announce in 2003. The negotiations 
were launched in January 2004, with a first round of negotiations in Bahrain. There is a second 
round in DC in March 2004 and an interim technical round in London. The negotiations 
conclude by May of the same year. The agreement is signed later in the year, ratified in 2005, 
and comes into force August 1, 2006 (see Appendix D for timelines). According to the USTR, 
the agreement would eliminate tariffs on 81 products and that the U.S. exports to Bahrain, and 
Bahrain would dramatically open its services markets to the U.S. Bahrain officials noted that 
they hoped the agreement would both open up opportunities for exports to the US, as well as 
attract U.S. investment that would create jobs (such as in the financial and tourism sectors in 
Bahrain) (Xinhua 2004). 
 
 Bahrain has trade agreements with countries other than the US. It negotiated an FTA with 
Thailand in 2002, and as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), entered a 
Cooperation Agreement with the European Union as early as 1988. This set the stage to negotiate 
an FTA, but those discussions have been off and on for some time. In 1999 the GCC decided to 
create a customs union which would come into force in January 2003. The GCC and EU 
resumed negotiations for an FTA in March 2002 with a broader mandate, and required a 
sustainability impact assessment of the proposed trade agreement. 
 
6. 1.1 Labor Standards in Bahrain 
 
 The State Department calls Bahrain a “hereditary emirate.” The Human Rights report 
issued in 2001 states, “The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled Bahrain since the late 18th 
century and dominates all facets of its society and government.” The country adopted its first 
Constitution in 1973, which allowed for the election of a National Assembly. However, the 
Constitution was then mostly suspended in 1975.  
 
 The Constitution provided workers the freedom to join unions and associations, but when 
the Constitution was suspended the situation for workers rights was not clear. According to the 
ICFTU, “The partially suspended 1973 Constitution, recognizes the right to organize, but the 
1981 Ministerial Orders make no reference to this right and only authorises the establishment of 
Joint Consultative Councils” (ICFTU 2001). By the year 2000, there were no independent unions 
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in the country. Instead, workers joined the Joint Labor-Management Committees. Employer and 
government intervention was strong in these committees.  
 
 In February 2002, the country passed a new Constitution. This reaffirmed the King as the 
head of the country, but established a legislative body and provided for elections for some 
positions. In September of the same year, the King passed a new labor law that gives workers the 
freedom to join independent trade unions and engage in collective bargaining. While foreign 
workers had been denied rights in the past, the new labor law allows them to join unions as well. 
 
 The labor law allows workers the right to strike but with restrictions. According to the 
State Department reports, the law was vague in some areas, but did require that three-quarters of 
members vote to approve a strike, and that the union and employer went to arbitration first 
before a strike was allowed. The King has since issued a series of reforms to the labor law, 
including Ministerial Orders issued in September 2002, August and September 2005; a Circular 
in February 2003; and a revision of the law in 2006. The 2006 revisions restrict the rights of 
workers in a number of sectors from striking, declaring them “essential services.” This included 
security services, civil defense, airports, ports, hospitals, transport, telecommunications, 
electricity and water services. 
 
 In May 2009 the government reformed the law governing foreign workers so that 
guestworkers would not be directly tied to their employer. Under the old sponsorship system 
employers could withhold workers passports and greatly restrict their freedom to change jobs or 
leave the country. The amendments changed the system so that the guestworkers would be tied to 
the government rather than the employer. However, Human Rights Watch (2010) reports that by 
2010 it is not clear if the amendment has been implemented. 
  
6.1.2  Trade Negotiations 
 
 Bahrain made significant improvements in its labor laws in 2002, and through some of 
the government reforms and regulations since then. The Constitution re-establishing rights in the 
country was passed in February 2002, before the country signed a Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the U.S. a few months later. It may be possible that the U.S. 
pressured Bahrain to make changes to its law before it could sign onto the TIFA but we could 
find no evidence of this. 
 
 The labor law was changed in September 2002, just before the U.S. and Bahrain held 
their first TIFA Council meeting. After the Council meeting, USTR Zoellick notes the progress 
the country has made in terms of political rights and labor rights (USTR 2002). By the time the 
countries announce their intent to negotiate an FTA in May 2003, Bahrain had established that 
soldiers and maritime workers were not allowed to join unions. The ILO allows for countries to 
exempt military personnel from freedom of association, but not maritime workers. Furthermore, 
the laws are unclear about the rights of public sector workers to unionize. While the King issued 
a Circular in 2003 establishing that workers in government ministries may join unions, the 
country was still considering a law in 2004 that would clearly establish the right of all public 
sector workers to join independent trade unions. 
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 By 2004, workers had organized unions but also begun to encounter resistance from 
government agencies and employers. The State Department and ICFTU reports both note cases 
of possible retaliation by employers for union activity in March 2004, two months before the 
U.S. and Bahrain conclude FTA negotiations. 
 
 The free trade agreement, negotiated under the 2002 Trade Act, mandates that the Labor 
Advisory Committee comment on the proposed FTA. The final text of the FTA was made 
available to the public in May 2004, and the LAC submitted its review in July. This report 
summarized concerns raised by the ILO and ICFTU, including: 
 
• Restrictions on political activity by trade unions. This violates Article 3 of ILO 
Convention 87 
• The country does not allow political parties, and does not allow for citizens to replace 
their leader, further restricting the freedom of unions to engage in political activity 
• Labor law only allows one trade union federation, and one union per workplace, 
restricting workers’ freedom of association 
• Many restrictions on the right to strike 
• Poor treatment of foreign workers, with some cases of indentured servitude, violating 
ILO Convention 29 
• Domestic workers are not covered by labor law 
• There is no minimum wage in Bahrain, and foreign workers in particular are subject 
to under-payment and non-payment of wages 
 
It appeared that the USTR did not agree with the concerns raised, and the Bahrain made no 
changes to its standards in this period. The FTA was signed in the fall of 2004.  
 
 The next year the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions submitted Case 2433, 
alleging that public sector workers do not have full freedom of association because they cannot 
join the union of their choice. Furthermore, they allege that the government has refused to certify 
six public sector unions. The ILO Committee found in favor of the Trade Unions, and asked the 
government to assure that the labor law is amended to allow full freedom of association for 
public sector workers.  
 
 The FTA still had to be approved by the Senate and House. In October 2005, 
representatives in Congress call on Bahrain to improve its labor law. For example, 
Representative Cardin (D-MD), “cited a ban on workers in the same company forming more than 
one union, vague laws regarding penalties for anti-union discrimination, the ability of companies 
to withhold foreign workers' salaries for up to three months and the "onerous" restriction on 
unions over strikes” (Gulf Daily News 2005). In a November 3rd House Ways and Means 
Committee meeting key Democrats withheld their support for the FTA, citing concerns over 
labor rights (Norton 2005). 
 
 According to a letter from House Democrats to the USTR, the Minister of Finance of 
Bahrain promised on November 10, 2005, to push forward legislation to amend the country’s 
labor laws (Inside US Trade March 31, 2006). The Minister promised to introduce two 
amendments to Parliament within a week, and an additional four by the end of the year, and to 
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press for expedited action. In a December 6th letter, the Bahrain government confirmed that it 
had submitted the legislation to Parliament. On the basis of these promises, the House ratified the 
FTA the next day, and the Senate followed a week later (Inside US Trade March 31, 2006). 
 
 In another letter dated February 15, 2006, Bahrain again wrote that it had submitted the 
legislation to Parliament, but then did not confirm whether the changes had been made. By 
March 29th, 2006, the Democrats wrote to the USTR expressing their concern over the matter. 
(Inside US Trade March 31, 2006). The USTR replied on April 4, assuring that the laws had 
been submitted to Parliament. In addition, Bahrain noted that one reform, dealing with workers 
fired for trade union activity, had already passed both Houses of the National Assembly (Inside 
US Trade, April 7, 2006).10 President Bush signed an implementation proclamation for the FTA 
in July and it came into force August 1, 2006. 
 
 In December 2006 the government passed more reforms, but this time it issued new 
regulations banning strikes in a large number of sectors (Inside US Trade, December 6, 2006). 
Unionists were fired in several cases, after taking part in strikes or other union activity. When 
Indian migrant workers struck over poor conditions in their construction jobs in 2008, the police 
arrested them and threatened to deport them. 
 
 In Case 2552, filed in 2007, the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions asserts 
that the 2002 labor law, along with labor law revisions passed in 2006, unduly restrict the right to 
strike by declaring a broad range of sectors as “essential services.” Under these provisions, 
workers were prevented from striking in the areas of security services, civil defense, airports, 
ports, hospitals, medical centers and pharmacies, all means of transport of persons or goods, 
telecommunications, electricity and water services, bakeries, educational institutions, and oil and 
gas installations. The ILO found that the laws in Bahrain were in fact, overly restrictive, and 
called on the country to amend the law so that only actual essential services were covered. The 
country has not responded as of 2010. 
 
6.1.3 Conclusion 
 
 Bahrain has made substantial improvements in its labor laws since the turn of the 21st 
century. In 2002 the country revised its laws to allow workers the freedom of join trade unions 
and engage in collective bargaining. In 2006 it made reforms allowing multiple trade union 
federations, and requiring that workers fired for union activity be rehired immediately. It appears 
that the process of engaging in negotiations for trade agreements with the U.S. led Bahrain to 
improve its labor standards. 
 
 However, the country did not make all the changes it promised to make. Bahrain assured 
the USTR that it would comply with ILO standards, but after the FTA was implemented the 
country extended a ban on strikes that went far beyond ILO conventions. Futhermore, since the 
FTA came into force labor repression has increased in the country, leading to backsliding labor 
                                                 
10 The ICFTU Annual Report states: “Since October 2006, a decree on employment in the private sector prohibits 
dismissal for trade union activities. Employers are also obliged to reinstate the sacked employees and to provide 
compensation if it is proved that they were discriminated against because of their union work.”  
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standards. The largest drop in our labor standards index is from 2001 to 2002, when the index 
goes from 8.4 to 2.4 (Total1-adjusted, normalized). Labor laws were changed after the countries 
signed a TIFA, but this pre-dates FTA negotiations. From 2002, the index slowly rises 
throughout the decade to 5.9 in 2008, then drops slightly to 5.3 in 2009. 
 
 One of the major areas of concern raised by the LAC and Congress was the treatment of 
foreign workers. Bahrain assured the USTR that it would amend its laws and practice so as to 
address these concerns. Yet Human Rights Watch reported that human rights conditions in 
general in Bahrain have been deteriorating over the past few years, particularly for migrant 
workers (2009).  Although the government formally ended the sponsorship system for foreign 
workers in 2009, according to the Migrant Worker Protection Society, the practice of 
withholding passports is widespread (Human Rights Watch November 4, 2009). Human Rights 
Watch (2009) reported on cases where workers had passports and wages held by employers - 
some as much as four months in backpay. Despite amendments to the laws, the practice appears 
to be continuing as of 2010 (Hamada 2010). Furthermore, according to an article by a Parliament 
member, foreign workers must give three-months notice to change employment in Bahrain, 
making it difficult for many workers to do so (Ali 2009).  Also in 2010, the Bahrain Labour 
Ministry decided that it would not apply a minimum wage for foreign workers in the private 
sector, despite the concerns raised by the LAC regarding minimum wage rates for foreign 
workers (Trade Arabia 2010).  
 
 
6.2 Oman 
 
 The U.S. and Oman signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2004. In 
November of that year, the USTR notified the Senate and House of the plans to begin 
negotiations for a free trade agreement under the 2002 Trade Act. In the letter, Zoellick noted 
that the USTR’s office intended to push Oman to make further improvements to its labor laws, 
including better enforcement of existing laws (Zoellick 2004). The countries concluded their 
negotiations in October 2005, and signed the FTA January 2006. The House and Senate 
approved implementing language in the summer of 2006, but the Senate had to vote again to 
approve the House version of the bill in September 2006. The FTA came into force January 1, 
2009.  
 
6.2.1 Labor Standards in Oman 
 
 Oman is a monarchy, with a Sultan who acts as head of state and head of government. 
The country enacted universal suffrage for everyone over age 21 in 2003, but voters can only 
elect representatives to an advisory council. The government joined the ILO in 1994 and 
promised to reform its labor law, but did not do so until April 26, 2003.  The new law made it 
legal for workers to join representative committees, but it did not yet provide for freedom of 
association. While it removed a prohibition on strikes, it did not explicitly provide the right to 
strike. 
 
 On July 21, 2005, the country ratified two ILO core conventions, raising their total to 
four out of eight of the core conventions signed. This included Convention 105 (Abolition of 
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Forced Labor) and 138 (Minimum Age). The country had already ratified Convention 29 (Forced 
labor) in 1998 and Convention 182 (Worst Forms of Child Labor) in 2001. 
 
 In 2006 the government issued a series of labor law reforms that greatly expanded worker 
rights. Workers now had the right to freedom of association and to join independent trade unions 
and not just worker committees. They were allowed to engage in collective bargaining and 
strikes. The law allowed more than one union at a firm, and it removed a number of barriers to 
union membership and functioning. For example, prior regulations stipulated that union leaders 
be fluent in Arabic, but this was dropped. New laws in 2007 set out clear procedures for 
collective bargaining.  
 
6.2.2 Trade Negotiations 
 
 The initial FTA negotiations went fairly quickly. After the USTR announced intentions to 
negotiate, the countries held two formal rounds of negotiations. During this period Oman made 
no changes to its labor law, but did ratify two ILO Conventions. The text of the agreement went 
to the public for comment, and the Labor Advisory Committee submitted a report calling for the 
rejection of the FTA.  
 
 The Labor Advisory Committee of the USTR issued its report on the US-Oman FTA in 
November 2005. This was before the major reforms of 2006, and therefore the committee noted 
the extreme weakness of labor standards and rights in the country. The report noted the lack of 
FA/CB rights, as well as the restricted labor rights for foreign workers. It also highlighted the 
weak language regarding labor standards enforcement within the FTA. The committee 
highlighted concerns regarding labor language in prior FTAs, and argued that mechanisms for 
dispute resolution over labor issues should be as strong as mechanisms over commercial dispute 
issues in the agreement. 
 
 Despite these objections, the U.S. and Oman signed the agreement in early 2006. After 
that, the agreement went to Congress for ratification. Some news sources stated that the U.S. 
administration was hoping to have the FTA ratified and in place within a few months. However, 
as Congress debated approval of the agreement, some Representatives expressed concern about 
the lack of labor rights in Oman.11  
 
 Oman responded by promising to amend the country’s labor laws. In a series of letters in 
March the Minister of Labor promised the USTR that they would improve the labor law by 
October 31, 2006. According to the Washington Post, Democrats in Congress were concerned 
that the promised reforms did not go far enough, and appeared “to address fully only one of the 
10 areas where Oman’s labor laws do not comply with basic international standards” (Reuters 
2006). Cardin noted that Oman only seemed to commit to adopting ILO Conventions, but not 
necessarily to other a stronger enforcement provision in the FTA (Inside US Trade March 31, 
2006).  Democrats were concerned that they would have to vote on the agreement before seeing 
the actual laws changed. Furthermore, they felt they only had vague assurances from the Oman 
government, and little information from the USTR office, on specific changes would be made 
                                                 
11 Congress raised other objections to the FTA, most notably provisions around port security.  
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and whether these changes were already submitted to Parliament in Oman (Inside US Trade 
March 31, 2006). Representative Sander Levin noted his concern, “"We're supposed to move 
ahead on statements as to what a government will do, and those are vague.” (Inside US Trade 
March 31, 2006). 
 
 In addition to the LAC report issued in 2005, labor activists raised concerns about the 
conditions for foreign workers in Oman. The National Labor Committee (NLC) released a report 
in May 2006 that examined labor conditions in the Jordan garment industry. The authors 
estimated that foreign workers were employed in the trade zones who had their passports 
confiscated and were working under forced labor conditions. The report raised concerns that the 
Oman FTA could create similar conditions there, as the Jordanian workers were producing for 
many U.S. based companies. After the release of the NLC report, the Senate Finance Committee 
passed two amendments to the legislation that would implement the FTA. These amendments 
declared that products made in Oman “with slave labor (including under sweatshop conditions so 
egregious as to be tantamount to slave labor) or with the benefit of human trafficking,” would 
not be covered by the FTA (Bolle 2006; Crittenden 2006).  The amendment, however, was only 
advisory, and the USTR responded with reasons why they did not think it was necessary or 
feasible to include in the final language. Meanwhile the Oman Minister of Labor made promises 
of more revisions to the country’s labor laws.  
 
 Despite no actual labor reforms occurring, the Senate approved the agreement on June 
29, 2006. The following week, the Oman government announced Royal Decree 74 on July 8, 
2006, providing workers with the right to join trade unions and engage in collective bargaining. 
In addition, the country outlawed forced labor (Bolle 2006). 
 
 Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee noted several concerns with the 
reforms, including: 
 
a. Only partially addresses protection from anti-union discrimination; insufficient 
protections for workers fired for union activity 
b. Does not address employers who hold onto passports from foreign workers, thereby 
forcing them to stay in a job 
c. Does not provide clear procedures for strikes 
d. Does not go far enough to eliminate government interference in union activity 
(Inside US Trade, July 14) 
 
 The Sultanate noted that specific details on regulations would need to be developed by 
the Ministry of Manpower, which would happen by the fall. The House of Representatives went 
forward and approved the agreement on July 20 by a vote of 221-205. Those opposed to the FTA 
argued that the reforms were not strong enough, and that the FTA still did not include strong 
enough language on enforcement.12  
 
                                                 
12 Of course, some Representatives voted against the Agreement for reasons other than labor issues. 
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 The Senate had to approve the language again in September. The measure was approved 
62-32 although some Democrats took the opportunity to critique the agreement. According to 
CQ Weekly: 
 
Max Baucus of Montana, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance 
Committee, criticized the administration’s handling of trade negotiations — 
particularly its refusal to adopt a provision dealing with slave labor approved by 
the panel in an advisory markup — even as he declared support for the Oman 
accord (McGrane 2006). 
 
With the Senate’s approval, the act was ratified later that year. In late 2006 and early 2007, 
Oman issued a series of laws and regulations which met some of the promises: it provided 
workers freedom of association and right to collective bargaining, the right to strike, and 
increased protections for discrimination for union activities.  
 
 In this same time period, the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority was set to expire July 1, 
2007. The Bush administration has been pushing for approval of not only the Oman FTA, but 
agreements with Panama and Peru. Some observers noted that the close vote on Oman “signaled 
trouble ahead” for Bush’s plans for TPA renewal (Van Dongen and Higa 2006). On May 10, 
2007, the USTR adopted the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade, setting up procedures to govern 
trade negotiations after the TPA expired. The new agreement included stronger language in a 
number of areas, including labor rights. In particular, the bipartisan agreement required that 
parties to a trade agreement adopt and enforce “the core internationally-recognized labor rights, 
as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.” The new 
protocol stated that all labor obligations “are subject to the same dispute settlement procedures 
and enforcement mechanisms as obligations in other Chapters of the Agreement” (USTR 2007).  
 
 In late 2008, USTR representative Susan Schwab travelled to Oman to discuss final 
changes before the FTA came into force. The U.S. had outstanding concerns related to 
intellectual property provisions, rules of origin, access to the telecommunications market, and 
labor language. Oman made a number of changes, particularly around intellectual property rights 
and opening up the telecommunications market. On November 23, they passed Royal Decree 
128 on forced labor and human trafficking. However, they took no further steps to strengthen 
their laws protecting union members from discrimination. Furthermore, the USTR did not push 
to include stronger enforcement language for labor rights in the agreement. The AFL-CIO stated 
that the Oman agreement violated the spirit of the agreement reached in Congress around Trade 
Promotion Authority renewal in May 2007 which developed a new protocol for trade 
agreements.  
 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
 
 Like Bahrain, Oman made significant improvements to its labor standards since the turn 
of the current century. In 2006 the labor standards index for the country fell from 9.8 to 3.7, right 
in the midst of the Congressional voting to approve the FTA. There appears to be strong 
evidence that Oman changed its labor laws due to pressure from the U.S. However, the country 
did not address all concerns in its reforms, and in fact passed  
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 The index for Oman increased in 2007, but then fell again, ending at 2.5 in 2009. 
Although critics were unhappy that the U.S.-Oman FTA did not include stronger labor standards 
and enforcement language, the Oman case appears to provide the strongest example of a country 
making changes to its labor standards in relation to concerns raised during FTA negotiations. As 
the agreement was only ratified in 2007, and in force since 2009, it is early to assess the trends in 
labor standards post- FTA negotiations. 
 
 Even with the improvements there were incidents of violations of workers rights, 
particularly among foreign workers. For example, when guestworkers from India and Nepal went 
on strike against poor pay and working conditions in 2007, police used force to break the strike. 
Twelve workers were held for three weeks without charges and then deported (ICFTU Annual 
Report 2008; U.S. State Department Human Rights Report 2007). Some government control of 
trade union activities remained, as did some barriers to exercising certain rights (such as 
restrictions on strikes). 
 
6.3 Chile 
 
The U.S.-Chile Joint Commission on Trade and Investment was created in 1998 to 
develop a framework for negotiations on an FTA between the two nations. The U.S. approved its 
Trade Promotion Authority in 2000, renewing “fast track,” and Chile and the U.S. began 
negotiating a US-Chile FTA on December 6, 2000. The countries signed an agreement on June 6, 
2003 and the FTA went into effect January 1, 2004. Chile is one of the most active countries in 
the world in pursuing trade agreements. As of early 2010, Chile has signed onto 56 free trade 
agreements. 
 
6.3.1  Labor Standards in Chile 
 
After a military coup in 1973, the country was put under an intensive market 
liberalization program. From 1973 to 1979 strikes were illegal, and workers were not allowed to 
engage in collective bargaining. In 1979 and in the early 1980s a series of reforms were passed 
and became known as the Labor Plan, and were then solidified in 1987 as the Labor Code.  
These reforms related to laws about indexing wages to inflation and regulations on union 
activity. For the most part, the reforms were designed to make the labor law system more flexible 
for employers – for example, union membership became voluntary, and employers were allowed 
to negotiate with individual employees rather than the union. The Constitution established 
collective bargaining as a system based at the firm level, and the Labor Plan intensified that 
framework by giving employers even more power at the firm level. Employers were allowed to 
replace workers during a strike, and allowed to dismiss workers without just cause. 
 
With the move to democratic rule in 1988-1990, pressure grew for Chile to grant labor 
rights to workers. However, by this time, union density was only about 10 percent and labor 
markets were highly flexible (for employers), with a high rate of turnover (Haagh 2002). 
Furthermore, the neoliberal economic policy and ideology had come to permeate much of the 
political system making it difficult for advocates to push for stronger union rights. While the new 
government undertook a series of labor law reforms in 1990-91, the changes were minor (Haagh 
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2002). A new package of reforms was comprised in 1994 but not ratified by Congress throughout 
the 1990s. 
 
In 1999 and 2000 Chile ratified a number of ILO conventions, and by 2000 it had ratified 
all eight of the fundamental conventions.  
 
In September 2001, alongside trade negotiations, major labor reforms were finally passed 
after a contentious vote (Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 2001). The package, which went into 
effect November 1, 2001 included some measures that were not popular with labor - for 
example, it reduced the mandatory severance pay that employers were required to provide when 
laying off workers (Pulido 2001). However, it included a long list of improvements for workers 
and unions, including: 
 
• “Significantly improved workers’ rights to organize” (GAO 2009) 
• Reduced official workweek from 48 to 45 hours per week 
• Stronger overtime pay regulations 
• Improved safety standards 
• Reduces requirements to form unions 
• Outlaws employers from firing union leaders 
• Outlaws certain employer anti-union activities 
• Improves the power of labor inspectors 
• Increases the fines that the Ministry of Labor can impose on employers 
 
In their 2002 country report meeting, the ILO wrote of Chile and ILO Convention 87: 
“the National Congress has amended the Labour Code to provide improved application of the 
Convention. Specifically, through the amendments made to the Labour Code, the scope of 
application of the right to organize has broadened, the number of persons required in order to 
establish trade unions has decreased, certain conditions for trade union leadership eligibility have 
been abolished and the power of the authorities to interfere in trade union organizations has been 
reduced” (ILO 2002). The ILO has found other points of concern, however, and in a 2007 
Committee Report encouraged the government to pursue a set of labor reforms on strike 
language in current law.  
 
6.3.2 Trade Negotiations 
 
As early as 1992, then-president George H.W. Bush noted that the U.S. would begin 
negotiations with Chile for a Free Trade Agreement. Chile was interested in becoming a fourth 
partner to the NAFTA agreement, but in the end was not part of that agreement (Velozo 2006). 
Still, Chile pursued bilateral agreements such as the FTAs it signed with Canada in 1996 and 
Mexico in 1998. The country also negotiated and signed a Chile-Mercosur and a Chile-Central 
America FTA around the same time. 
 
The US-Chile Joint Commission on Trade and Investment was created in 1998 to create a 
framework for negotiations. At the time, President Clinton did not have “fast track” authority, 
meaning that the President would have less freedom in negotiating a trade agreement. Chile and 
the U.S. began negotiating a US-Chile FTA on December 6, 2000.  
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Environmental and labor standards were already a concern regarding the potential FTA, 
given that these had been hot-button issues in the NAFTA debate and in related discussions 
concerning Chile’s inclusion. The Chile-Canada agreement signed in 1996 included a labor side 
agreement similar to that included in NAFTA, but Chile still had very restricted labor rights. In 
fact, in June 2001 the Trade Union International of Workers of the Energy, Metal, Chemistry, 
Oil and Related Industries of Chile files a complaint with the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association regarding a company hiring replacement workers during a strike (ILO Freedom of 
Association Case 2141, Report 327). The complaint also notes that a worker was killed, and 
another seriously injured, when a truck driver drove through the picket line.  
 
Despite concerns about labor law, the U.S. and Chile quickly began almost monthly 
negotiations to move the process forward with frequent rounds of negotiations in 2001. As 
mentioned above, in September 2001 Chile passed labor reform. This took place in the midst of 
FTA negotiations but there is no evidence that it was a direct result of pressure from the US. 
 
In 2002 the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association issued a judgment in the 
replacement worker case and concluded that the Chilean labor law was currently at odds with 
ILO conventions in allowing replacement workers for strikes not deemed essential. The 
Committee called on the Chilean government to amend its Labor Code regarding this issue, 
echoing earlier similar requests from the Committee of Experts. The Committee also issued an 
interim report on Case 2172, filed by the Trade Union of Pilots and Technicians of (the airline) 
Lan Chile, alleging wide ranging anti-union tactics by the airline in late 2001. The Committee 
notes that while it has not yet heard from the airline, available information from the government 
appears to back-up the claims. 
 
During this period, President George W. Bush was working to renew “fast track” 
authority. President Clinton was not able to win a renewal of fast track throughout his two terms, 
after it had expired in 1994. Democrats made it clear that they were concerned about labor 
standards in relation to trade agreements. However, on December 6, the House passed the Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001 by a vote of 215-214. This vote was seen as a victory for 
President Bush, and possibly a signal that a FTA can pass without strong labor rights. The Senate 
passed a version of trade authority in May 2002, and a Conference Committee developed a 
compromise bill in July 2002. That bill, H.R. 3009: The Trade Act of 2002, was passed in 
another close vote a few days later. 
 
A few days after that, on July 31, 2002, Chile formalized changes to its Labor Code, 
consolidating various elements into five chapters. This included sections on individual contracts 
of employment; worker protection; trade unions; collective bargaining; and an employment 
tribunal (NATLEX Diario Oficial, 2003-01-16, núm. 37460, págs. 5-45).  
 
Meanwhile, FTA negotiations progressed. There were five more rounds of negotiations in 
2002, ending with the 14th round. On December 11, 2002 the countries announce the conclusion 
of FTA negotiations. On January 29, 2003, the U.S. formally declares its intent to enter into a 
FTA with Chile. 
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The Labor Advisory Committee (along with other committees) submits its report on the 
potential impact of the proposed FTA. In a report dated February 28, the LAC concluded that 
“the labor provisions of the Chile and Singapore FTAs will not protect the core rights of workers 
in any of the countries involved, and represent a big step backwards from the Jordan FTA and 
our unilateral trade preference programs.”  The LAC argued that the FTA should include 
language requiring countries to meet ILO core labor standards, and to include real mechanisms 
for enforcing those laws. In particular, the dispute settlement mechanism in the FTA applied only 
to commercial violations and not labor violations. 
 
The LAC also noted that the FTA would eliminate Chile from Generalized System of 
Protections (GSP) status with the U.S. That would mean that the GSP petition process would no 
longer be available as a tool to enforce labor rights in Chile. The AFL-CIO and other unions, 
working with Chilean NGOS and labor rights groups, filed a GSP petition against Chile in 1986 
because of worker rights violations at the time. After a long review, the U.S. suspended Chile 
from the list of GSP beneficiaries in 1988. The benefits were not reinstated until Pinochet’s rule 
was ended and democratic rule restored in the country (Compa and Vogt 2001). Under the FTA, 
a country found to be not effectively enforcing its own labor laws will at worst suffer a fine 
which will effectively go back into its own budget. The LAC argued that this was not an 
adequate penalty for non-compliance, and that it would be a significant step back from the 
withdrawal of trade benefits which occurred under the GSP. Furthermore, because the FTA only 
required countries to enforce their own domestic labor laws, the LAC report noted that countries 
could have an incentive to eliminate a law altogether if they had trouble enforcing it.  
 
The USTR responded to the LAC report but did not agree with its conclusions. The FTA 
was signed on June 6, 2003. Under the guidelines of the Trade Act of 2002, the U.S. Department 
of Labor submitted a report on labor rights in Chile (done in consultation with the Department of 
State and the United States Trade Representative) to Congress on July 8, 2003. That report 
acknowledged that Chile had made significant improvements in labor rights and noted that in 
2001 the country established a new system to process labor disputes (Department of Labor 
2003).  
 
 On July 16, 2003, John Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO called on Congress to reject 
the proposed FTA (along with the proposed agreement with Singapore). Sweeney notes the weak 
framework of the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority, and argues that it doesn’t provide adequate 
measures to protect workers rights (Sweeney 2003). Despite these objections, the House of 
Representatives passes the agreement on July 24, 2003, and by the Senate on July 31, 2003. The 
FTA became law in the U.S. on September 3, 2003. The Chilean Congress then approved the 
agreement and the FTA entered into force on January 1, 2004. 
 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
 
 Since the FTA came into effect, Chile has made some additional progress on its labor 
standards. For example, it passed protections against sexual harassment in 2005, and protections 
for subcontracted workers in 2006.  
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 At the same time, labor conditions appear to have become worse in other areas.13 There 
have been 19 cases filed with the ILO Freedom of Association Committee since the FTA went 
into effect. These allege a range of anti-union activity, including firings, arrests, use of police 
force during demonstrations, and illegal bans on strikes. Large numbers of subcontracted 
workers in several sectors demonstrated for greater rights. In 2007, a forestry worker was killed 
after police shot him three times during a strike (ITUC Chile report 2008). That same year a 
national trade union demonstration was “brutally suppressed by security forces using smoke 
bombs, tear gas, batons and water canons. Over 260 demonstrators were arrested” (ITUC 2008). 
In the midst of this, the country’s new subcontracting law went into effect 2007. The law 
states that employers can only hire subcontracted workers under special circumstances or for 
“extraordinary events” (Rosado Marzon 2010). Otherwise, subcontracted workers would be 
considered regular employees. The law gave the Department of Labor (DT) the power to enforce 
the law.  
 
The DT found that the state-owned copper mine, Codelco, had illegally hired 5,000 
workers under subcontracting when they should have been regular employees. The DT ordered 
Codelco to absorb the subcontracted workers into the permanent workforce and pay a fine. 
Codelco challenged the ruling, and the Supreme Court eventually ruled in their favor, stating that 
the DT had no jurisdiction over employers. The Court ruled that the DT had violated the 
employers’ Constitutional rights, including “the right of persons to be judged by a court…, the 
right to freely make labor contracts, the right to right to engage in legal economic activities and 
the right to private property” (Rosado Marzon).     
 
According to law professor Cesar Rosado-Marzon, at this point, the law appears to be 
unenforceable. This means that the growing workforce of subcontracted workers do not enjoy the 
same rights as regular employees, leaving a large segment of workers out of the labor law 
reforms of 2001/2002. 
 
In 2009 the Governmental Accounting Office released a study which concluded that 
Chile has made some progress in reforming the law and improving the inspection process leading 
up to and since the 2004 FTA. However, there are still a number of problems. Chilean labor 
officials noted that they have not received the funding or support from the U.S. agencies that 
they had hoped for and need. In 2003, ILAB provided a $1.4 million grant to Chile for training 
labor inspectors and working to improve the labor law courts. However, it seems that the project 
did not meet its goals as it was “overly ambitious, given its resources.” In addition, funding for 
the project was cut in 2005 due to budget cuts for ILAB. Chile remains eager to receive technical 
assistance from the US.  
 
Our index of labor standards reflects the complex pattern discussed here. Chile went from 
6.5 in 1997 to 4.7 in 1999, then jumped up to 7.1 in 2000. The index stayed high until it dropped 
again to 4.1 in 2005 and 2006 but then doubles to 8.2 in 2007. The variations in the index reflect 
some changes to laws but also changes in employer and government interference with labor 
                                                 
13 As mentioned earlier, this is possibly an endogenity problem. If unions get stronger they may be more active in 
asserting their rights, and in filing more grievances or charges. 
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union activity. In terms of trade negotiations, the first periods when the index dropped 
significantly took place just before the U.S. and Chile entered formal negotiations in 2000 (this 
was also when Chile ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98), but then standards worsened once 
negotiations started.  The second large drop in the index took place two years after the FTA was 
ratified.  
 
6.4 Morocco 
 
The U.S. and Morocco began negotiations in early 2003 and the agreement was finalized 
in early 2004 after eight rounds of negotiations (EIU 2008: 15). The agreement came into effect 
on January 1st, 2006 (EIU 2008: 15). Immediately, 95 percent of trade between the two nations 
became duty free. (Ways and Means Committee, House of Representatives, July 7 2004) The 
Moroccan government has strongly supported the FTA, believing that the agreement will 
stimulate demand for Morocco's exports, including textiles and food, while potentially 
transferring U.S. technology and knowledge in sectors such as financial services, telecoms and 
information technology (EIU 2008: 50). 
 
6.4.1 Labor Standards in Morocco 
 
According to the Economist (2008), Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the 
king possesses far more power than parliament. Labor rights are firmly enshrined in Moroccan 
law. Article 9 of Morocco's constitution guarantees freedom of association (Morocco: The 
Constitution, 2002). The Moroccan Constitution also guarantees citizens the right to freely 
choose work, equality in gaining employment, and the right to strike (DOL 2004a: 4). 
 
In July 2003, the Moroccan Parliament approved a new labor code which took effect June 
8, 2004 (DOL 2004a: 4). The labor code had been in development for many years, and in 2000 a 
general strike was only halted by a government agreement to revise the draft version of the code 
and raise wages (EIU 2003: 5). Among other things, the final version of the labor code 
formalized the right to trade union representation, (EIU 2007: 30) changed regulations 
concerning lay-offs and reinforced the right to negotiation (Trade Unions of the World 2005: 
224). The law does not cover workers in private homes or many informal businesses such as 
corner shops and garages (Trade Unions of the World 2005: 224). Both employers and unions 
have criticized the new labor code, with employers claiming it doesn't afford them sufficient 
flexibility and unions claiming it removes workers' rights (EIU 2008: 31). Additional legislation 
regarding workers' right to strike is still awaited (EIU 2008: 31). Although constitutionally 
guaranteed, the right to strike is currently legally restricted. (DOL 2004a). 
 
Morocco has not ratified Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize) (ILO 2009: 4). Portions of the convention are found in the new labor 
code, but there are limitations on trade union rights for certain types of workers (ILO 2006: 6). 
Civil servants can be punished for taking part in “coordinated work stoppages or collective acts 
of indiscipline” (DOL 2004a: 10). 
 
Government monitoring of work conditions, and thus the government's ability to enforce 
labor law, has consistently suffered from problems over the eleven year span which this report 
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covers. In April 2008, approximately 55 people died in a mattress factory fire in Casablanca after 
“inspectors had identified safety violations that weren't corrected.” (GAO 2009) The State 
Department’s Human Rights Reports have noted numerous shortcomings in enforcement of labor 
law in Morocco over the years before and after the FTA’s signing. A 2008 State Department 
reports notes that “Labor inspectors attempted to monitor working conditions and investigate 
accidents, but they were too few in number and lacked sufficient resources.” 
 
6.4.2  Trade Negotiations 
 
Negotiations between the two countries on a free trade agreement began in early 2003 
(EIU 2008: 15). In July 2003, the Moroccan Parliament approved the new labor code which took 
effect June 8, 2004 (DOL 2004a: 4). The labor code had been in development for roughly two 
decades prior to its approval. In a Hearing before the House Ways and Means committee on July 
7, U.S. ambassador to Morocco, Peter Allgeier implied that the FTA negotiations put pressure on 
the Moroccan government to pass the stalled reforms: “What I would particularly like to 
emphasize in this regard is that this process has spurred significant labor law reform in Morocco, 
which entered into force a month ago and prior to this process had been stymied for several 
years” (Ways and Means Committee, House of Representatives, July 7, 2004).14 
 
The agreement was finalized in early 2004 (EIU 2008: 15). The Labor Advisory 
Committee (LAC) report on the U.S.-Morocco FTA was fairly scathing. The report criticizes 
recent labor law reforms in Morocco as inadequate and the labor provisions in the FTA as weak 
(LAC 2004). Among the specific shortcomings of Moroccan labor law targeted in the report was 
the failure of the then-new labor code to adequately protect the right of workers to strike (LAC 
2004: 4-5). The report also notes that the rules of origin allow for duty free benefits even if only 
35 percent of the value of the product is created in the FTA agreement countries. The LAC 
argued that this could result in corporations doing most of the manufacturing in other nations 
before bringing the goods into Morocco for export to the U.S., which would mean fewer jobs for 
both Moroccan and U.S. workers (LAC 2004: 8).  
 
The LAC noted that “the agreement’s enforcement procedures completely exclude 
obligations for governments to meet international standards on workers’ rights.” (LAC 2004: 1) 
In fact, “only one single labor rights obligation – the obligation for a government to enforce its 
own labor laws – is actually enforceable through dispute settlement.” (LAC 2004: 4) The 
consequences of a violation of the labor section of the FTA are mild compared to the 
consequences of violating the commercial section. Among other issues, fines are not paid to the 
injured party, but essentially go back to the government of the offending nation. (LAC 2004: 6) 
 
Several members of the House expressed concern that ILO standards were not integrated 
into the agreement. Congressmen Levin and Becerra in particular critiqued the inclusion of 
strong intellectual property language while labor language was so weak, arguing that it was made 
little sense to infringe upon a nation's sovereignty in one way but not the other. It is important to 
note that the agreement does reference the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
                                                 
14 Congressman Crane noted that Morocco’s minimum wage was set to increase by ten percent as of July 1, 2004, 
and that Morocco “did this to make itself a more attractive FTA partner” (Congressional Record July 22, 2004). 
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Rights at Work and its Follow up, however, it only obliges the parties to “strive” to meet the 
standards therein. Other congressmen praised the agreement's labor section and Morocco’s recent 
passage of labor reforms. Congressman Houghton argued that the enforcement section would 
encourage Morocco to carry out its newly reformed labor law (Ways and Means Committee, 
House of Representatives, July 7 2004).  
 
 Despite the concerns of some members of Congress, the Senate and House approved 
implementing language and the bill in July 2004. The president signed the bill into law on 
August 3, 2004. Morocco then took some time before ratifying the bill so it did not go into force 
until January 1st, 2006 (EIU 2008: 15). 
 
The final text of the agreement contained a side letter with language for the creation of a 
variety of subcommittees to help Morocco and the U.S. carry out their agreement. Although 
several opponents raised concerns about the minimum wage in Morocco, the final U.S.-
Moroccan FTA contains clear language stating that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to impose obligations on either Party with regard to establishing the level of minimum 
wages” (U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement: 16-4).   
 
6.4.3 Conclusion 
 
 Morocco is cited as an example of a country that has made positive changes in labor 
standards due to FTA negotiations with the U.S. (e.g. Karesh 2008). Our labor standards index 
suggests that this is partially true. The index dropped from 4.7 in 2002 to 2.4 in 2003, in the 
midst of FTA negotiations. The drop reflected a change to labor laws which had been 
languishing for many years, and which formalized the right to join trade unions. However in the 
next year, the government put forward a law on the right to strike which contained many 
restrictions. According to the ICFTU Annual Survey, “certain articles make it impossible to 
exercise the right to strike and violate several international conventions ratified by Morocco.” At 
the same time, intervention in trade union activity by government and employers increased. The 
labor standards index went up to 7.1 in 2004 and remained in that range for the rest of the 
decade. 
 
 A 2009 GAO report noted that “U.S. and Moroccan officials told us the subcommittee on 
labor affairs had never been convened. Meetings are not required, and Labor has not sought to 
convene one. Moroccan Ministry of Labor officials with whom we met were not aware that such 
a body could be formed.” (23) On May 18th of 2010, the Subcommittee on Labor Affairs was 
finally convened. 
 
Two Freedom of Association cases were filed with the ILO related to events since the 
new labor code took effect in 2004. Case number 2455, filed by Aircraft Engineers International 
(AEI), on behalf of its affiliate, the Moroccan Union of Aviation Technicians (STAM) alleges 
that that the Royal Air Maroc (RAM) company refuses to recognize and negotiate with STAM 
and that the company engaged in anti-union harassment against the officials and members of 
STAM. By the time the ILO issued its findings the union and company appeared to have 
resolved their differences, but the ILO recommended to the government that it ensures that RAM 
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recognizes STAM and “it negotiates with STAM's representatives, being the most representative 
trade union, who must not be subjected to anti-union discrimination or harassment” (ILO 2006). 
 
In case number 2461, the Moroccan Labour Union (UMT) alleges that the local 
authorities of the town of Bouznika used force to intervene following a protest strike held by a 
local trade union in 2005. The union was protesting the suspension of its general secretary, who 
had been suspended without prior notice and in violation of existing procedure shortly after the 
union had been established. The police intervention resulted in several people being injured and 
the arrest of nine union officials. The ILO found that the arrest of union members for engaging in 
union activity is a breach of freedom of association, and that the workers were engaged in a 
legitimate strike. It called on the Moroccan government to investigate the matter further, and to 
ensure that the government did not use a section of the penal code regarding “obstructing the 
freedom to work” in a way that conflicted with freedom of association.  
 
6.5  El Salvador 
 
 The US and El Salvador signed a free trade agreement as part of the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). After NAFTA was signed in 1994, the US began pursuing a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement with the intent of bringing most of the 
countries in Americas into one agreement. It became clear that there was considerable opposition 
to the FTAA by the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the fall of 2001, leaders from five countries 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) met with the US to discuss a 
smaller scale agreement. In January 2002 President Bush announced plans to pursue a Central 
American trade agreement. After TPA was secured that summer, the US formally announced its 
intent to begin negotiations. CAFTA negotiations took place in nine rounds during 2003. The US 
reached an agreement with four of the countries by December 2003, but needed one more round 
of negotiations with Costa Rica January 19-25, 2004. The US completed negotiations with the 
Dominican Republic and initially signed the DR-CAFTA in 2004. The Senate and House passed 
the DR-CAFTA in 2005.  
 
 The Act then needed approval in the partner countries. El Salvador approved the measure 
in 2004 and the FTA went into force with that country in 2006.15 
  
6.5.1 Labor Standards in El Salvador 
 
 El Salvador became an independent republic in 1838. Its current Constitution was passed 
in 1983 and amended in 2003. The country erupted into a bloody Civil War from 1980 to 1992 
but has been relatively stable since then. The labor laws were established in the Constitution, as 
well as a Labor Code enacted in 1972 and amended in 1994. The 1994 revisions were seen by 
some analysts as the most extensive in Latin America (Anner 2010). These provide workers 
freedom of association, and the right collective bargaining and striking, but excludes public 
sector workers on the grounds that they provide essential services. 
 
                                                 
15 Costa Rica put the measure to a public referendum in October 2007. There was strong opposition to CAFTA but 
the measure passed and the Costa Rica piece of CAFTA-DR went into force later than in the other countries. 
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 At the time that CAFTA negotiations began in 2003, the ICFTU noted that despite some 
legal protections, labor standards were weak in El Salvador and the country had not yet ratified 
ILO Conventions 87 and 98 claiming that doing so would violate their Constitution which 
prohibits public sector workers from unionizing. Furthermore, the laws required prior 
authorization to form a union (in violation of Convention 87), and high thresholds for striking. 
Workers illegally fired for union activity do not have any rights for reinstatement. Workers must 
be citizens of the country in order to hold union office. There are several complaints filed to the 
ILO Freedom of Association committee per year. There were 22 cases filed from 2000 to 2008; 
many of these deal with anti-union discrimination.   
 
 Observers note that labor rights in export processing zones are particularly weak. In 
2001, the National Labor Committee made public a study conducted by the country’s Ministry of 
Labor documenting abuses in EPZs. The report, which had been suppressed by the government, 
documented wide-spread anti-union behaviors and noted than none of the 229 factories in the 
four largest EPZs had a union contract. 
 
 In 2006, El Salvador ratified four ILO Conventions, including core Conventions 87 and 
98. The European Union adopted a Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) policy in 
2005 and required any country that wanted access to ratify 23 international standards including 
the eight Core ILO Conventions. El Salvador was granted temporary access to the program but 
that was set to expire at the end of December 2006 if it did not comply with the Conventions. In 
August 2006 the El Salvador Congress amended its Constitution to extend freedom of 
association to “employees of autonomous public institutions, officials and civil servants and 
municipal employees” (NATLEX, Diario Oficial, 2006-09-01, núm. 162, págs. 4-5). They also 
amend the language in the Constitution, extending the right to strike but also giving employers 
the right to lockout employees (Diario Oficial, 2006-09-01, núm. 162, pág. 5). Congress then 
ratified the ILO Conventions and therefore guaranteeing continued participation in the EU GSP+ 
program. 
 
 Despite this change, the new reforms were found to be unconstitutional by a 
Constitutional Court in 2007. In addition, the 2006 reforms introduced further restrictions on 
public sector workers by widening the kinds of workers prohibiting from unionizing. That same 
year, the country passed an Anti-Terrorism law which was used against trade unionists 
organizing a demonstration.  
 
 A new government was elected in 2009 and took office June 1. They passed reforms 
extending freedom of association to some public sector employees. In the first months they also 
established a trade union education center within the Labor Ministry. The goal was to provide 
education on labor rights.  
 
 Over the past decade much attention has focused on the issue of child labor in El 
Salvador. The government announced in 2000 that it would focus on reducing child labor, and 
the US Department of Labor has assisted that effort. In July 2010 Department of Labor Secretary 
Hilda Solis announced that the U.S. would give $10 million towards a new ILO child labor 
program to be administered in cooperation with the government of El Salvador. 
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6.5.2 Trade Negotiations 
 
 El Salvador played a leading role in the CAFTA negotiations. President Francisco 
Guillermo Flores Perez of the ARENA party was elected in 1999 and made it a goal to 
strengthen relations with the U.S. Flores implemented economic reforms and pushed an export-
oriented strategy. Despite some challenges to their power, the ARENA party won the 2004 
presidency again, with the election of Elias Antonio Saca, who continued with the CAFTA 
negotiations and pushed further trade agreements with other countries. 
 
 The CAFTA negotiations were announced in 2002 despite much attention given to the 
poor working conditions in Central American factories. A 2001 New York Times story profiled 
the anti-sweatshop movement and efforts to organize workers in El Salvador, noting some 
success at a factory producing for Gap, but acknowledging the low wages and long overtime 
hours in most factories (Kaufman and Gonzalez 2001). The National Labor Committee applied 
consistent pressure on factories in El Salvador through the media and in workplaces. In 
November 2002 the union UNITE published a report highlighting continued abuses in Gap 
factories around the world, including El Salvador. Around the same time, various NGO 
representatives testified before the Trade Policy Committee expressing concerns about the 
upcoming CAFTA negotiations relating to a number of issues including labor rights.  
 
 The US began formal CAFTA negotiations in January 2003, and continued throughout 
the year. The Central American countries also pursued negotiations with Canada at the same 
time. According to news sources, the US lagged on introducing labor language into the 
negotiations. On April 10, Senator Max Baucus called for a report on labor rights in CAFTA “at 
the earliest point possible during the negotiations but no later than when President Bush notifies 
Congress of his intent to enter into a trade pact with the five Central American countries” (Inside 
US Trade April 11, 2003). Also in April, 63 NGOs submitted a formal letter to the USTR 
regarding those concerns (Inside US Trade May 16, 2003a).  
 
 The U.S. finally tabled a proposal on labor language at the fourth round of negotiations in 
mid-May. Nine House Democrats submitted a letter to the USTR expressing dissatisfaction with 
the proposal, citing that it was not strong enough as it did not require countries to comply with 
the ILO Core Conventions and did not include enforcement mechanisms, among other things 
(Inside US Trade May 16, 2003b). On May 19, Representative Sander Levin said that the 
CAFTA would not likely pass without better labor language. The ILO released a report on labor 
laws in the CAFTA countries and found a number of areas in El Salvador law that were not in 
compliance with ILO standards. 
 The USTR defended its approach to labor standards in June. At a June 10, 2003 House 
Committee on Ways and Means hearing, USTR Representative Peter Allgeier said U.S. 
negotiators are aware that labor markets in Central America are very different from those in 
Chile and Singapore and have made clear to their Central American counterparts that labor will 
be one of the issues addressed during the CAFTA negotiations. He said that they would work 
with the Central American countries to get their labor standards and labor rights enforcement up 
to a certain level before they were considered acceptable. Allgeier also claimed that El Salvador 
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(and Guatemala) had made recent efforts to improve their labor laws. The U.S. committed $15.2 
million over three years (Fiscal Years 2003, 2004 and 2005) towards the Cumple y Gana system 
to improve enforcement. This project would pursue a variety of strategies to work with 
governments, employers and workers on capacity building, monitoring systems and training.16  
 Later that summer Congress voted on the Chile and Singapore FTAs. Some key 
Democrats voted in favor of the FTAs but noted that they would not likely vote in favor of 
CAFTA without revisions on labor language. In July Robert Zoellick stated that the USTR’s 
concern was not with the labor laws on the books in Central America, but the enforcement of 
laws. To that end, the U.S. strategy was to work with the Central American governments and 
international organizations on better implementation (Inside US Trade, July 11, 2003). 
 In November 2003 members of Congress wrote to the USTR office to outline their 
objections to CAFTA’s labor language. In December 2003, just before the final round of 
negotiations, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing labor abuses in factories in the 
country. The report went into detail on various violations in a number of industries. It argued that 
the country not only failed to pass laws meeting international standards, but also did a poor job 
enforcing the laws it does have, in part due to the lack of labor inspectors (only 37 labor 
inspectors for workforce of approximately 2.6 million). Shortly afterwards, a group of Senators 
issued a letter to the USTR calling for better standards in CAFTA.  
 At a February 25, 2004 meeting Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for the Americas 
Regina Vargo indicated that the U.S. would not make changes to the labor standards in CAFTA. 
Instead, she reiterated that the U.S. was not concerned about the labor laws in the countries but 
their enforcement (Inside US Trade, February 27, 2004).  
 Peter Allgeier underscored the administration’s commitment to passing CAFTA in a May 
17, 2005 House Committee on Ways and Means hearing: “the rejection of DR-CAFTA would 
send a terrible signal worldwide about U.S. leadership in opening markets and using trade as a 
mechanism for lifting people out of poverty.  It would be even more disastrous with respect to 
this hemisphere.” 
 Throughout this period, the government of El Salvador continued to push hard for the 
passage of DR-CAFTA and insisted its labor laws were adequate. Vice minister of foreign affairs 
Roberto Interiano said that the country was in compliance with ILO standards and that the media 
reports of labor law violations were likely “isolated cases” (Hau 2004).  At other times President 
Vaca noted that is wasn’t a priority to improve labor law as long as there were not jobs in the 
country. Not all in El Salvador agreed. According to a New York Times story Antonio Aguilar 
Martinez, employed by an independent government watchdog agency, said the labor standards 
must be stronger as “CAFTA protects the fundamental rights of businesses but not the labor 
rights of the citizens” (Becker 2004). 
 Still, El Salvador made small reforms. In February 2004 the El Salvador Congress added 
a paragraph to its Labor Code which prohibits employers requiring pregnancy tests from women 
                                                 
16 Additional funding was approved later for subsequent years.  
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applying for jobs (Diario Oficial, 2004-03-17, núm. 53, pág. 68). They also passed laws 
increasing penalties for employers found guilty of stealing worker contributions for social 
security or union dues. In April 2004 El Salvador established a tripartite commission aimed at 
reforming the Labor Law so that it could be in compliance with ILO Conventions. This 
commission was also charged with examining ways to increase employment it the country.  
 In July 2004 the Vice Ministers of Trade and Labor in each of the DR-CAFTA countries 
met under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to develop 
recommendations on improving labor laws and enforcement in the country. They released a 
report with their findings in April 2005, noted that the IDB would provide some financial support 
for meeting these goals. For the most part, the recommendations for addressing concerns with 
labor laws included holding public forums and increasing education. However, the report does 
call for some legal reforms as well as implementing structural changes, such as establishing a 
permanent capacity-building program for judges, lawyers and government officials.  
 According to Mark Anner (2008), the U.S. government also pressured El Salvador to 
increase the share of its total budget spent on labor law enforcement. The country complied but 
only made a small increase, and the Ministry of Labor still has a total budget that amounts to less 
than one quarter of one percent of the federal budget. The amount in 2008, even after being 
increased, was less than the budget share in 2002. However, the country did hire 69 more labor 
inspectors, more than doubling their staff (Anner 2010). 
 On November 5, 2004 an organizer with the Teamsters union was murdered in El 
Salvador. Gilberto Soto was working to build a network of port workers throughout Central 
America when he was murdered. The police charged his mother-in-law but she was later 
acquitted, and the government did not pursue a further investigation. Furthermore, according to 
some reports the country’s Human Rights Ombudsman was hindered in her own investigation 
into the murder and received death threats. This incident highlighted some of the reasons for 
concern about the situation for trade unionists in the country. Labor unions and NGOs continued 
to raise objections to DR-CAFTA. Still, El Salvador made no moves to change its laws. 
 
 On April 4, 2005, four members of the Committee on Ways and Means submitted a letter 
to Peter Allgeier stating their continued concerns with CAFTA labor language. They noted that 
their letter from November 2003 received no response at all, either from the office of the USTR 
or from the governments of the countries in question. CAFTA proponents continued to argue that 
the problem in Central America wasn’t the laws themselves but only the enforcement of laws. In 
the letter, the Congressmen listed specific areas in which the countries fell below international 
standards. For El Salvador they listed the weak remedies for workers fired for union activity (a 
violation of Convention 87), and high barriers to form an industrial union (also a violation of 
Convention 87) (Cardin, Rangel, Becerra and Levin 2005). 
 
 Two months later the U.S. Senate voted 54-45 to approve CAFTA-DR. The House of 
Representatives approved the measure by a very close vote (217-215 with two abstentions), amid 
some controversy over the way voting was conducted and the pressure placed on some members 
to change their votes. The Senate took a second vote, as required by law, and approved the 
measure again on July 28. President Bush signed implementing legislation on August 2, 2005. 
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Despite an intensive campaign by advocates and some members of Congress the labor language 
was not changed and El Salvador made no major reforms to its labor laws during this period. 
 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
 
 Our indices show that El Salvador ended the 10 year observation period better than when 
it started. One might conclude that CAFTA trade negotiations or subsequent trade with the U.S. 
helped the country to improve labor standards. However, a closer look reveals more complex 
patterns. 
 
 In the year 2000, El Salvador has a relatively high score of 6.47 for Total1-Normalized. 
This drops to 4.71 in 2001, primarily due to a drop in violence against unionists. However, the 
score climbs over the next three years, from 2002 to 2004, coinciding with the period of CAFTA 
negotiations. During this period unionists experience increasing repression from the government 
and employers. The index then is relatively stable (it decreases and increases somewhat) over the 
next few years as CAFTA is approved and comes into force.  
 
 It is not until 2008 and 2009 that we see another significant change, as the index drops 
twice, ending at 3.53 in 2009. What accounts for these latter drops? In 2008 there are no reported 
cases of arrests, murders, violence against unionists. Employers do not interfere with strikes, but 
this may be a result of less strike activity in the time of the global economic recession. In 2009, a 
new government comes into office and passes new reforms that extend freedom of association to 
some public sector workers.  
 
 Our index only goes through 2009 but reports suggest that conditions for workers and 
labor leaders are still serious. On January 15, 2010, the general secretary of a Municipal 
Employees union (SITRAMSA) was murdered. He had been receiving death threats but 
continued his union activities, and was killed on his way to a union meeting (ITUC 2010). This 
suggests that the latter drop in the index for El Salvador may only be temporary. It might also be 
that scores were higher in years when there is more media attention on El Salvador. In 2003 
through 2005 the country was under intense scrutiny as CAFTA negotiations took place. Cases 
of violence against unionists were well-documented. It may be possible that the scores for El 
Salvador dropped in later years partially because there was less media attention highlighting 
abuses.  
 
 The variations in the El Salvador index also suggest that improvements had less to do 
with U.S. government pressure during CAFTA negotiations, or CAFTA implementation. The 
country made its most significant reforms in 2006 while negotiating with the EU for coverage 
under their GSP+ program, and again in 2009 when a new government more friendly to labor 
and less friendly to the U.S. government came into power. The U.S. has put considerable 
resources into the Cumple y Gana project to improve labor law enforcement in Central America. 
More research is needed to document the impact of these programs in El Salvador.17 However, 
                                                 
17 Reports from the U.S. State Department and the ITUC, as well as from the ILO, Washington Office on Latin 
America, International Labor Rights Forum all note continued problems with labor law enforcement in the country 
since CAFTA was passed. A 2008 USAID report summarizes outcomes from capacity building and training 
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Professor Mark Anner makes the case that enforcement of existing laws is not adequate. In 
countries that have a history of serious labor union repression and violence, additional laws may 
be needed to help workers overcome their fear of organizing in order for workers to truly 
experience freedom of association (Anner 2008).  
 
6.6 Case Study Conclusion 
 
 Case studies allow us to see the changes in country indices within a context. Based only 
on the indices it appears that Oman and Bahrain made great progress in their labor standards. 
The case study approach allows us to see that the progress is in part because they began at such a 
poor level. Morocco and Chile have been held up as examples of how FTA negotiations can help 
push countries to adopt labor legislation. While it is true that both countries did improve their 
labor laws within the approximate time range of FTA negotiations, the case studies show that the 
situation in each country was more complex than just a clear improvement in labor standards. 
Finally, the El Salvador case highlights the challenges of evaluating some of the DR-CAFTA 
countries, where the legal standards were relatively stronger but where implementation is weak 
and trade union repression is high.  
 
 We argue that further research is needed to develop case study material on each of the 20 
countries with FTAs. This is the best way to understand changes in the countries and how those 
intersect with FTA negotiations and implementation.  
 
 
7. Policy Implications 
 
The data presented above has several policy implications. First, we underscore the 
conclusions other analysts have reached, which is that trying to quantify labor standards is 
challenging and subjective. It is very difficult to get consistent, reliable, objective annual 
information for a wide range of countries. Many concepts associated with labor standards are not 
easily measured and scholars must simplify nuanced circumstances and concepts in order to 
translate events into a number or score. This suggests that no measure of labor standards will be 
perfect, and no number or score can stand alone without qualitative contextual analyses. 
Therefore, we caution readers to draw policy conclusions only from those countries that have 
case study analysis in addition to a quantitative score. This suggests that future research is 
needed to develop case studies for all countries with FTAs. This is particularly true for Canada 
and Mexico as the State Department and ICFTU reports used for these indices were much less 
comprehensive than more recent reports.  
 
 The data also shows that few countries have clear unidirectional patterns when it comes 
to labor standards. Most countries show some improvement and some deterioration over an 
eleven year period. For example, as countries pass labor laws giving workers the freedom to join 
unions, unions are likely encounter growing resistance and interference from employers and/or 
                                                                                                                                                             
programs in Central America. That report states that employer resistance to multi-stakeholder initiatives involving 
unions was highest in El Salvador, there was a high risk of the project “making little progress.” The team was only 
able to complete one factory training (Salem 2008).  
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governments.  This suggests that attaching trade agreements to labor standards cannot be done 
from a snapshot in time. If the goal is to use trade negotiations or trade relations to raise labor 
standards, labor standards must be regularly evaluated during negotiations and after an 
agreement is signed and ratified. 
 
 Finally, our data suggest that FTAs may not always be a policy vehicle for addressing 
labor standards. We find no one clear pattern in our FA/CB measure over time for the majority of 
countries, either during the negotiation process or over a longer time period. There may be 
relationships between FTA negotiations and labor standards, but it will take more analysis and 
case studies to determine the patterns. In particular, we suggest that future research is needed to 
add more case study analysis for each of the FTA partner countries. The research should include 
in-depth interviews with US Congressional representatives and government officials to 
understand trade relationships. It should also examine the role of different presidential 
Administrations, including the role of the Office of the USTR and Department of Labor. It is 
likely that monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor language varies depending on the priorities 
of a particular Administration. 
 
 Further research should also explore whether other policies have more direct impacts, 
such as an enhanced trade program like the U.S. textile program with Cambodia; GSP programs; 
or targeted capacity-building programs done in conjunction with the ILO.  
 
  
8. Caveats and Limitations 
 
 The measure we created has several weaknesses. As others have noted, there are many 
challenges to coding labor standards. The ideal index would capture changes in labor laws (legal 
reforms); changes in labor standards (regulatory changes); and changes in enforcement. Each of 
these dimensions occurs in different branches of government, and sometimes those branches may 
even be in conflict with one another. Furthermore, there can be a lot of variation within a country 
(such as between states in the U.S.), making it difficult to come up with one measure for the 
whole country. 
 
 As noted above, the quality of information available on labor standards varies by country 
and over time. The limits of our source material have been discussed extensively in other places 
(e.g, Compa 2005; Kucera 2007). Evaluators are subject to bias when coding each indicator. The 
source material is subject to bias, based on the agency and person collecting the information and 
writing the report.  The quality of the State Department and ICFTU reports changes depending 
on the total staff available for investigating and writing about countries. Reports also rely on the 
information available in the media, which is not consistent.  
 
 Some countries have inconsistencies in reporting from year to year. For example, State 
Department Human Rights reports from Mexico in late 1980s claim that workers have freedom 
of association and there is little government intervention. Later reports note that there is heavy 
government and party intervention, as well as many company unions. Also, those early reports 
say public sector workers are not allowed to strike. In 1992, the reports say public sector workers 
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do have the right to strike but strikes are rare. There is no discussion of why the change in the 
reports, but it is not due to a change in law or regulation, rather a new interpretation of the law. 
 
 We coded our indicators as 1/0 measures, whereas a rank-order measure may account for 
greater variation. For example, a country that had one trade unionist arrested in a year would get 
a 1 for ‘arrests,’ as would a country that had systematic arrests. Some criteria seem better suited 
to a 1/0 score, such as “general prohibition on right to strike” or “rights restricted in EPZs,” 
whereas criteria such as “interference with union rights of assembly” might benefit with rank-
order scaling. 
 
 Often the line between trade union rights and broader political rights is blurred. In some 
cases, union members were arrested or punished for taking part in broader demonstrations, such 
as against the coup in Honduras. If reports specifically mentioned union activists or leaders 
taking part in the demonstrations, we treated this as part of union activity (e.g., if a union leader 
was arrested during a demonstration against a dictator, privatization, or trade agreements, we 
coded this as “arrest for union activities.” 
 
 The “enforcement” indicator was difficult to measure. Few countries would ever be able 
to achieve a ‘0’ for enforcement. Instead, we tried to measure the concept relatively. This meant 
considering the enforcement capacity and structures relative to other countries, but also relative 
to what might be possible within the country. Here, the +/- measure is perhaps the most 
important, as it indicates where a country is improving or getting worse. (The NAS/ILAB matrix 
approach of measuring change may be the best approach). Ideally, an enforcement criteria might 
be based on the number of inspectors in the country relative to the ILO prescribed number of 
inspectors. In addition, enforcement measures should account for the capacity of the legal system 
to process complaints; resources available for training inspectors, employers and employees 
about labor standards; and some measure of the strength of penalties for non-compliance. 
Initially we hoped to use more criteria to capture enforcement, based on several proposed by 
CMILS for government performance. In practice the data sources we used had very little 
information on enforcement and we had to collapse various criteria into one. 
 
 Due to these concerns, our measure is not necessarily solid as a comparative measure, but 
better for measuring progress (or retreat) within a country over time.  
 
 In addition to measurement limitations in the index, we also note that there are possible 
problems with measuring the process of trade negotiations. In our study, we track changes three 
years prior to the announcement of formal negotiations around an FTA with a country. However, 
in a number of cases the U.S. had already been engaging in negotiations over other kinds of 
agreements, such as a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. For example, the U.S. 
signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with Bahrain in 1999, and a TIFA in 2002. Then in 
2003, Bahrain and the U.S. announce their intent to negotiate an FTA. A more in-depth analysis 
should go back further and analyze the impact of the BIT and TIFA negotiations on Bahrain.  
 
 Similarly, we might include negotiations with other countries in our analysis. Chile 
negotiated and signed an FTA with Canada before it signed an agreement with the US. The 
Chile-Canada FTA includes labor standards language, and therefore any changes in Chilean 
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labor law due to trade agreement negotiations may be due to pressure from the Canadian 
government. El Salvador ratified ILO Core Conventions 87 and 98 after CAFTA was in force. 
The ratifications seem clearly a result of demands placed by the EU in relation to their GSP 
program. 
 
 Finally, we note that it may be possible that there are certain exogenous factors at play. 
Many countries show an improvement in labor standards in the early 2000s. At this time there 
was increased global attention on labor standards and international trade, in the context of global 
protests and growing critiques of the World Trade Organization. The ILO did not adopt it 
fundamental eight core labor conventions until 1998, and there was strong pressure for countries 
to ratify Conventions 87 and 98 in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Countries that show declining 
labor standards in 2001-2003 may have been lowering standards in response to the global 
economic recession that hit in that time period. Future research might examine how the trends in 
the labor standards index correlates with global political movements, as well as global economic 
conditions. 
 
9. Future Research 
 
 We have suggested a few areas for future research. First, we strongly advise that case 
studies be conducted for all 20 countries with FTAs to provide the appropriate contextual 
background. 
 
 Second, we note that researchers could look for discernible patterns in indices by adding 
other FTAs to the database. Many of the countries that have FTAs with the US also have 
agreements with Canada and the EU. It is likely that the changes in labor standards of partner 
countries has as much to do with US FTA negotiations as with these other negotiations. Also, the 
indices can be updated to add another year of observations (for 2010) in a few months. 
Increasing the data points may enable researchers to see more clear patterns, such as: what do 
countries that have improving standards have in common? Does the timing of negotiations 
matter? Does the majority of improvement come during negotiation or after the FTA goes into 
force?  
 
 Finally, we argue that further research should consider other factors that may be relevant 
in explaining changes in labor laws, monitoring and enforcement, and court rulings. These 
include political regime changes and election cycles, economic recession, government stability 
and government budgets. It could also consider the impact of developments with international 
organizations such as WTO meetings and ILO programs.  
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A. KUCERA’S CODING RULES FOR THE CRITERIA USED IN OUR INDEX 
 
Freedom of association/collective bargaining-related civil liberties 
1–5 As defined in chapter 2 on “Trade Union Rights and Civil Liberties” of Freedom of Association: 
Digests of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of 
the ILO (1996). 
1 Murder or disappearance of union members or organizers 
 ■ Includes violence to family members. 
2 Other violence against union members or organizers 
■ Includes violence to family members. 
■ Includes coercion under threat of force (other than for 3 regarding forced exile or flight from 
country under threat) but not threats themselves or unspecified harassment. Does not include use 
of tear gas unless this results in injury. 
■ Double counts with 1 in cases of murder or disappearance but not other 
violence. 
3 Arrest, detention, imprisonment or forced exile for union membership or activities 
■ Includes prosecution and flight from country under threat. 
■ Includes laws that indicate sanctions for participating in union activities that may be illegal but 
that should not be illegal according to ILO Conventions. 
4 Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, free opinion and free expression 
■ Includes interference with freedom of movement, except as regards 5, and also includes 
surveillance. 
■ Includes problems with “access of trade union representatives to workplaces” (CFA 295th 
Report, p. 141). 
■ Includes search or entry without warrant and search or entry with warrant unless the latter is for 
illegal non-union related activities; 
■ Search or entry with warrant for illegal union related activities are also included for activities 
that should not be illegal according to ILO Conventions. 
■ Includes interference with general, protest and solidarity strikes when these involve assembly 
or demonstrations (otherwise included under 36, with doublecounting allowed between 4 and 36, 
for such strikes involving assembly and demonstrations). 
Right to establish and join unions and worker organizations 
6–23 As defined in articles 2 to 7 of Convention No. 87, with unions broadly defined to include all 
independent workers’ organisations, as per Article 10 of Convention No. 87. 
6 General prohibitions 
15 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from union membership 
■ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems 
involving these sectors/workers. 
■ Tradeable/industrial sectors defined to include manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities 
(industrial sectors) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
(additional tradeable sector). 
16 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from union membership 
■ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems 
involving these sectors/workers. Except regarding armed forces and police. 
■ “Essential services” not specifically defined are included. If evidence of excluded sectors does 
not allow one to distinguish between “tradeable/industrial” and “other” sectors, it is included in 
“other” sectors. 
 71
Right to bargain collectively 
24–31 As defined in chapter 14 of Freedom of Association (1996). 
24 General prohibitions 
 ■ As defined in chapter 14 of Freedom of Association (1996). 
29 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain 
■ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems 
involving these sectors/workers. 
■ Tradeable/industrial sectors defined to include manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities 
(industrial sectors) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing (additional tradeable sector). 
30 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to collectively bargain 
■ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems 
involving these sectors/workers. Except regarding armed forces and police. 
■ “Essential services” not specifically defined are included. If evidence of excluded sectors does 
not allow one to distinguish between “tradeable/industrial” and “other” sectors, it is included in 
“other” sectors. 
Right to Strike 
32–37 As defined in chapter 9 of Freedom of Association (1996). 
33 General prohibitions 
34 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to strike 
■ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems 
involving these sectors/workers. 
■ Tradeable/industrial sectors defined to include manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities 
(industrial sectors) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing (additional tradeable sector). 
35 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to strike 
■ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems 
involving these sectors/workers. Except regarding armed forces and police. 
■ “Essential services” not specifically defined are included. If evidence of excluded sectors does 
not allow one to distinguish between “tradeable/industrial” and “other” sectors, it is included in 
“other” sectors. 
Export processing zones 
37 Restricted rights in EPZs 
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APPENDIX B: CODING RULES FOR OUR ADDITIONAL CRITERIA 
 
Employer interference with FA/CB 
• refusing to negotiate a contract 
• firing or disciplining workers who engage in union activity 
• firing or disciplining workers who refuse to accept concessions 
• firing or disciplining workers who enquire about their rights 
• we only relied on reports of specific incidents, such as a specific firing. We did not include 
general comments from reports such as “there have been reports that workers are harassed.”) 
• In the case of public sector workers, direct interference from the employer (government)  is coded 
as employer interference 
 
Government barriers to FA/CB: 
• heavy government intervention in union affairs or elections 
• government requirements on union membership, such as nationality or literacy requirements 
• high thresholds of numbers for establishing unions 
• lengthy procedures to register a union 
 
Employer interference with right to strike 
• Calling in private security to break up strike 
• Employing replacement workers 
• Lockouts 
• In the case of public sector workers, direct interference from the employer (government) is coded 
as employer interference 
 
Government barriers to right to strike: 
• excessive requirements to strike, such as written notice far in advance 
• excessive government ability to declare strikes illegal 
• strikes only allowed in rare circumstances 
• strikes require high percentage of membership vote 
 
Foreign workers restricted rights to FA 
• foreign workers cannot join trade unions 
• foreign workers cannot be elected to union office 
• foreign workers cannot be employed by a union 
 
Enforcement 
• improvements (or deterioration) in government capacity 
• number of inspectors 
• legal apparatus 
• training for inspectors 
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APPENDIX C: COMPARISON OF LABOR STANDARDS INDEX TO KUCERA AND CMILS 
INDICATORS 
 
  
Criteria from Other 
Measures 
Criteria from Labor Standards Index Kucera CMILS
1 General prohibitions on FA 6, 13 A-2
2 
Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from union 
membership  15 A-4
3 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from union membership  16 A-3
4 Foreign workers: restricted rights on FA 16 A-5
5 General prohibitions on CB 24 A-10
6 
Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to 
collectively bargain  29 A-13
7 
Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to collectively 
bargain  30 A-12
8 Employer interference with FA/CB 10, 11, 28
9 Government barriers right to FA/CB 
12, 17, 27, 
31
A-6, A-7, A-11, 
B-5
10 General prohibitions on right to strike 32 A-14
11 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to strike  34  
12 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to strike  25  
13 Employer interference with right to strike 4
14 Government barriers right to strike 33, 36 A-15
15 Restricted rights in EPZs 37 A-4
16 
Murder of disappearance of union members or 
organizers 1 B-1
17 Other violence against union members or organizers 2 B-1
18 
Arrest, detention, imprisonment, or forced exile for union 
membership or activities  3 B-1
19 
Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, 
free opinion, free expression  4 B-1
20 Enforcement 
B-3, B-8, B-9, 
B-10, B-11
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APPENDIX D: CASE STUDY TIMELINES 
 
Bahrain 
 
March 2002  EU and GCC relaunch negotiations for an FTA 
 
June 18, 2002  US and Bahrain sign TIFA 
 
Sept. 24, 2002  Bahrain implements Worker Trade Union Law 
 
May 21, 2003  US and Bahrain announce intent to negotiate FTA 
 
June 15, 2004  US and Bahrain announce intent to sign FTA 
 
September 14, 2004 US and Bahrain sign FTA 
 
May 9, 2005  Ministerial order gives unions more rights  
 
November 10, 2005 Finance Minister of Bahrain promises more reforms 
 
December 7, 2005 US-Bahrain FTA ratified by House  
 
December 13, 2005 US-Bahrain FTA ratified by Senate 
 
January 11, 2006 Act to implement FTA comes into law 
 
March 29, 2006  House Democrats raise concerns that reforms have not passed 
 
April 4, 2006  USTR confirms changes have been made 
 
July 27, 2006  Proclamation to implement FTA 
 
August 1, 2006  FTA comes into force 
 
October 2006 Royal Decree is passed banning dismissals for union activity; Bans strikes in 
many sectors 
 
February 2007  Unions submit complaint to ILO about Trade Union law reforms banning strikes 
 
 
 
Oman 
 
April 26, 2003  Oman passes initial labor law reform 
 
July 7, 2004  US-Oman sign TIFA 
 
November 15, 2004 USTR announces intent to negotiate FTA with Oman 
 
July 21, 2005  Oman ratifies two core ILO Conventions  
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October 3, 2005 US and Oman conclude FTA negotiations 
 
October 17, 2005 USTR notifies Congress of intent to sign FTA 
 
November 15, 2006 Labor Advisory Committee submits report on FTA 
 
January 19, 2006 US and Oman sign FTA 
 
March 06, 2006  Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade 
• Thea Lee, AFL-CIO raises concerns 
 
March 31, 2006 House Ways and Means Committee releases letters from Oman government, 
pledging labor law reform 
 
April 5, 2006  House Ways and Means Committee hearing  
• Some House Democrats raise concerns about labor issues, withhold support 
 
May 10, 2006  House Ways and Means Committee approved draft implementing language 
 
June 26, 2006  President Bush submits implementing language to Congress 
 
June 29, 2006  Senate approves implementing language for FTA 
 
July 8, 2006  Oman issues Royal Decree, greatly expanding labor rights 
 
July 20, 2006  House of Representatives approves FTA 
 
September 19 2006 Senate reapproves FTA 
 
September 26, 2006 U.S. passes implementing language 
 
December 29, 2006 U.S. President signs proclamation to implement FTA 
 
February 4, 2007 Ministerial Decree establishing guidelines for a minimum wage 
 
May 10, 2007  Agreement between Bush Administration & Congress on implementing the FTA 
 
September 1, 2008 Ministerial Decree provides equal employment conditions for all members of 
GCC states 
 
Oct. 25, 2008  USTR rep travels to Oman to discuss final concerns 
 
November 23, 2008 Oman passes Royal Decree 128 on Forced Labor/Human Trafficking 
 
January 1, 2009  FTA goes into force 
 
 
 
Chile Timeline  
 
1994   Major labor reforms initiated but not ratified 
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July 5, 1997  Chile-Canada FTA goes into effect 
 
November 29, 2000 Clinton announces intent to start trade negotiations with Chile 
 
December 6, 2000 Chile and US begin negotiations 
 
June 18, 2001 Trade Union International of Workers of the Energy, Metal, Chemistry, Oil and 
Related Industries of Chile files a complaint with the ILO 
 
September 2001 Chile passes labor law reform 
 
December 6, 2001 U.S. House passes Trade Promotion Act of 2001 
 
May 2002  Senate passes Trade Promotion Act 
 
July 2002  The Trade Act of 2002 is passed 
 
December 2, 2002 14th round of negotiations 
 
December 11, 2002 US and Chile announce FTA negotiations are done 
 
June 6, 2003  US and Chile sign the FTA 
 
July 24, 2003  House of Representatives pass FTA 
 
July 31, 2003  Senate passes FTA 
 
September 3, 2003 FTA becomes law 
 
January 1, 2004  FTA goes into effect 
 
 
Morocco Timeline 
 
January 2000  Morocco ratifies ILO Convention No. 138 (Minimum Age)  
 
March 2000  Association Accord with the European Union comes into effect (EIU, 2003) 
 
January 2001  Morocco ratifies ILO Convention No. 182 (Worst Forms of Child Labor)  
 
2001 Moroccan government agrees to set up an Arab-Mediterranean free-trade zone 
with Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan (EIU, 2004) 
 
January 2003 Morocco and the United States enter into negotiations on a Free Trade 
Agreement (DOA, 2006) 
 
July 2003  The Moroccan Parliament approves a new labor code (DOL, 2004a) 
 
March 2004  Negotiations conclude; US announces intent to enter into an FTA with Morocco 
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April 2004  Labor Advisory Committee submits report to USTR 
 
June 2004  Free Trade Agreement signed with United States (EIU, 2008) 
 
June 2004  New labor code comes into effect (DOL, 2004a) 
 
January 2006  Free Trade Agreement with United States comes into effect (EIU, 2008) 
 
 
El Salvador Timeline 
 
January 16, 2002  Bush announces intent to negotiate FTA with CAFTA countries 
 
August 2002  TPA approved 
 
Oct 1, 2002  Administration notifies Congress of intent to start CAFTA negotiations 
 
Jan 2003  Negotiations begin; 9 rounds take place throughout the year 
 
Dec 3, 2003  CAFTA negotiations enter final round 
 
Dec 17, 2003  Negotiations reach agreement with four countries 
 
Jan 19-25, 2004  US and Costa Rica hold another round of negotiations 
 
March 15, 2004  US and Dominican Republic conclude negotiations 
 
March 19, 2004  Labor Advisory Committee to USTR submits report on CAFTA 
 
August 5, 2004  US signs CAFTA-DR 
 
December 17, 2004 El Salvador passes the agreement in Congress 
 
January 25, 2005 El Salvador ratifies the agreement 
 
June 23, 2005  US Senate approves CAFTA-DR 
 
July 28, 2005  House approves CAFTA-DR 
 
August 2, 2005  CAFTA-DR Implementation Act is passed in US 
 
February 28, 2006 Proclamation 7987 to implement CAFTA-DR is passed in US 
 
March 1, 2006  CAFTA enters into force in El Salvador 
 
August 24, 2006 El Salvador amends its Constitution to extend freedom of association to   
   public sector employees 
 
August 29, 2006 El Salvador ratifies four ILO Conventions 
 
